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Asset Lending, Unconscionable Conduct and Intermediaries1 
 
Abstract 
This article deals with cases where borrowers of loans for business or investment claimed 
their lender had engaged in asset lending which amounted to unconscionable conduct under  
the equitable doctrine or under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 
2001 (Cth). The article reviews recent cases, seeking to identify the key factors influencing a 
conclusion of, or against, unconscionable conduct. The article examines the practice of 
lending through intermediaries and how the application of agency law can insulate lenders 
from the wrongful conduct of intermediaries. The article explains the gap in the current 
position and discusses possible law reform which may remedy that.  
 
Introduction 
Asset lending occurs when a loan is made on the basis of the value of the real property 
subject to a mortgage security, without regard to the capacity of the borrower to service the 
loan from income.2 The land is not necessarily the expected source of the funds for 
repayment, but the lender’s attitude is that what matters is the availability of the land for that 
purpose.  Such an approach may be appropriate; it is common where the loan is for the 
purpose of developing the land, where the intention always is that the land will be sold to 
repay  the debt.3  In cases where the mortgage security is over the borrower’s home, however, 
asset lending has been criticised, because of the significance to the borrower of the loss of 
their home, when that was the borrower’s only asset.  Newspaper articles have alleged 
predatory practices associated with this lending.4   
 
A number of cases have dealt with attempts to obtain relief from loan contracts and 
mortgages where the borrower was in default, facing the loss of their home, where it was 
argued that the lender should have realised from the outset that the borrower could not afford 
the repayments and so was likely to lose the home, and where the purpose of the loan placed 
it outside the protections of the consumer credit legislation.5 The cases indicate some 
common features - these loans were frequently “low documentary” (“lo doc” loans),6 so 
borrowers did not have to provide documentary evidence to verify their incomes or savings 
history,7 often the borrower and lender dealt with each other through one or more 
                                                 
1 Denise McGill BA; LL.B (Hons)(UQ); LL.M (UQ), Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland University 
of Technology.  
2 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Khoshaba [2006] NSWCA 41 at 128; Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] 
NSWCA 343 at [96]; see also Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt  [2010] VSC 67 at [197]; Perpetual 
Trustees Victoria Ltd v  Kirkbride [2009] NSWSC 377 at [63]. 
3 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [112].   
4 “Courts rule against lenders as boom-time low-doc loan frenzy unravels” and “Banks ignored their own rules 
in race to fuel housing boom” Anthony Klan 13 June 2012 in “The Australian”; “Low-doc loan battle goes 
before High Court” Anthony Klan 22 June 2012 in “The Australian.” 
5 The loan in Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 was for a home but was accepted as being outside the Consumer 
Credit Code; the loans for residential property investment in Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares 
[2011] NSWCA 389 and in Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 would now be 
within the ambit of the National Credit Code but were made before its enactment. 
6 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt  [2010] VSC 67 at [23]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 
2) [2012] WASC 383 at [1]. The loans in Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 
and Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 were also lo doc loans. 
7 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389. (Allsop P with whom Bathurst CJ and 
Campbell JA agreed) at [5]. 
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intermediaries8 without any personal contact, and the loan was for the benefit of another party 
or their business,9 or the purpose of the loan was investment, sometimes with a fraudulent 
party who disappeared with the money.10    
 
Where a lender’s conduct can be classified as “asset lending,” in some circumstances the loan 
contract may be set aside on the ground of unconscionable conduct,11 and registration of the 
mortgage set aside under the in personam exception to indefeasibility.  This can be raised in 
equity, or under statute:  reforms to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act) have extended its unconscionability provisions to asset lending 
for investment purposes, as well as for business purposes. The equitable doctrine and the 
statute can apply irrespective of the loan purpose. If unconscionable conduct can be 
established, the remedy may be conditional upon the borrower repaying any benefit 
received.12  
 
In a number of recent cases, borrowers argued that their lender had engaged in asset lending 
which amounted to unconscionable conduct under the equitable doctrine or statute.  When 
courts have considered the relevant principles, they have written that a finding of 
unconscionable asset lending depends on “the circumstances.”13 The particular combination 
of circumstances necessarily varies for each case and the cases are “highly fact sensitive”.14 
There is no authoritative statement of a general test for when asset lending will be 
unconscionable, so as to justify a remedy.  It is therefore difficult to draw any definite picture 
of what kind of conduct in what kind of circumstances would be classified as 
“unconscionable”.  In this context, with heightened awareness of the harm caused by asset 
lending, more guidance is needed for the assistance of those advising lenders and defaulting 
borrowers.   
 
This article is in two parts. Part One describes the current legal position, including the 
remedies which may be available to borrowers, and reviews the recent cases, seeking to 
identify which are the key factors that tend to establish actionable unconscionable conduct, 
and which indicate that such a claim will not succeed. Part Two examines the common 
practice of lending through intermediaries and how the application of agency law principles 
can insulate lenders from the wrongful conduct of intermediaries.  This article then evaluates 
the effectiveness of the remedies in the context of lending practices based on a structure of 
sub-contracted intermediaries, to assess whether they provide sufficient protection for 
business and investment borrowers or whether law reform is needed and to what extent.  The 
focus is on unconscionability only. 
                                                 
8 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt  [2010] VSC 67; Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265; 
Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450; Tonto Home Loans v Tavares [2011] 
NSWCA 389. 
9 Teachers Health Investments Pty Ltd v Wynne BC 9603022 (NSWCA) July 1996; Elkofairi v Permanent 
Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841; Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97; Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] 
SASC 265; Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736. 
10 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt  [2010] VSC 67; Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd [2008] 
NSWCA 343; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450; Tonto Home Loans 
Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 
383; Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447. 
11  Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 at [96]. 
12 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 Edelman J at [397] -[400], [402], [406]; 
Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [233] - [236]; on appeal, see Violet Home Loans 
Pty Ltd (CAN 120 045 025) v Schmidt (2013) 300 ALR 770 at [36]. 
13  Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 at [96]. 
14 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 Edelman J at [172]. 
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Part One: Unconscionable Conduct in lending for business or investment purposes 
 
Consumer credit legislation relevant to this context 
Loans to debtors who are natural persons which are made “wholly or predominantly” for 
“personal, domestic or household purposes”15 have been regulated since 1996 by the Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code, which was replaced by the National Credit Code in 2010. The 
National Credit Code extended its ambit to loans to purchase, renovate or improve residential 
property for investment purposes or to refinance such loans.16  
 
The National Credit Code imposes positive and prescriptive obligations upon credit providers 
to lend responsibly17 and provides protections from over-commitment.18 The primary 
requirement for responsible lending is to make an assessment whether a credit contract or an 
increase in the credit limit would be unsuitable for the consumer: s 129.  Assessment involves 
inquiries about, and verification of, the consumer’s financial situation: s 130. If the consumer 
would be likely to be unable to comply with the obligations under the contract,19 or comply 
only with substantial hardship, the contract would be unsuitable for the consumer: s131 
(2)(a). Protections from over-commitment include the ability to challenge the loan as unjust: 
s76. Section 76, derived from the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), covers not only 
procedural but also substantive injustice, an indicia of which is that the debtor could not 
repay the loan without substantial hardship: s 76(2)(l). The National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act regulates lenders and intermediaries through a licensing regime.  Licensees are 
required to comply with a number of general conduct obligations, including engaging in their 
credit activities efficiently, honestly and fairly.   
 
There was a proposal to extend this legislation further to give some of these protections to 
those taking loans for business or investment purposes, but this has not progressed.20 The 
Abbott government has announced a Financial System Inquiry21 to report on developments 
since the 1997 Financial System Inquiry.22 
 
                                                 
15 The Code drew a distinction between two classes of purpose – business or investment purposes, on the one 
hand, and personal, domestic or household purposes, on the other, so the difference is between  consumer 
transactions, to which the Code is directed, and business or commercial use: Jonsson v Arkway  Pty Ltd [2003] 
NSWSC 815 at [21] – [23], see also Benjamin v Ashikian [2007] NSWSC 735 at [80] – [84]. The meaning of 
“personal” was explored in Jonsson v Arkway  Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 815 at [25]- [27]. 
16 In Shakespeare Haney Securities Ltd v Crawford [2009] QCA 85 Muir JA identified factors which suggested 
credit was provided there for business or investment purposes [41] and discussed the meaning of “business” [42] 
– [46] and of “investment purposes” [47]-[51]. Muir JA also commented that (the former) s 6(4) UCCC  ( now s 
5 (3) NCC) excluded “investment” but not “business activities” from “personal, domestic or household” 
purposes which suggested that investment purposes, in some circumstances, may come within “personal, 
domestic or household” [47]  
17 Chapter 3. 
18 Bruce Taylor “New National Responsible Lending Obligations” (2011) 39 ABLR 464 and (2012) 40 ABLR 
43. 
19 The consumer’s ability to meet all of the repayments, fees, charges and transaction costs of complying with 
the proposed credit contract must be assessed: Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Credit 
Licensing: Responsible Lending Conduct, Regulatory Guide 209  (March 2011) at [209.27].  
20 Exposure Draft National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment (Credit Reform Phase 2) Bill 2012 (Cth); 
see also Green Paper National Credit Reform “Enhancing confidence and fairness in Australia’s credit law” 
Treasury Department July 2010 p iii. 
21 http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release 20 December 2013. 
22 Financial System Inquiry Final Report (Wallis Committee) 1997 http:/fsi.treasury.gov.au 
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The common law  
For loans outside the scope of the consumer credit legislation, there is no duty on a lender to 
assess the capacity of a borrower to repay a loan23, to assess the viability of a loan or to verify 
details provided in loan applications.24 It is entirely for a lender to determine what inquiries it 
should make to verify information given in support of a loan application. 25 A lender does not 
owe a general common law duty to advise or protect a borrower from fraud,26 or from 
overcommitment.   
 
For these contracts, the only avenues of relief are the equitable doctrine of unconscionable 
conduct, or the unconscionable conduct provisions of the ASIC Act.27 
 
Remedies for unconscionable conduct  
 
The equitable doctrine  
Under the equitable doctrine laid down in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio 
(1983) 151 CLR 447, a contract may be set aside for unconscionable conduct.  
To raise a prima facie case, a party must establish: 
(a) the party suffers from some special disability or was placed in some special 
situation of disadvantage;28 and 
(b) the stronger party knew or ought to have known of this special disadvantage;29 
and 
(c) the stronger party took unfair or unconscientious advantage of their superior 
position by entering into the transaction.  
 
In recent years disadvantage has been regarded as falling into two categories - constitutional 
and situational.30 A constitutional disadvantage is an Amadio type disadvantage and stems 
from an inherent infirmity, weakness or deficiency.31 A situational disadvantage arises out of 
the business or financial weakness of the disadvantaged party: it arises out of the intersection 
of the legal and commercial circumstances in which the parties find themselves.32 
 
The disadvantage must seriously affect the ability of the weaker party to make a judgment as 
to their own best interests and the other party must know or ought to know of that 
circumstance and of its effect on the weaker party.33 If it should “have been obvious” to the 
stronger party that the transaction was improvident for the weaker, then they should have 
realised that the weaker party’s entry into it was due to inability to make a judgment as to 
what was in their best interests. 34 
                                                 
23 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [173]. 
24 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [173]; Micarone v Perpetual Trustees (1999) 75 
SASR 1; [1999] SASC 265 Debelle and Wicks JJ at [625]. 
25 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees (1999) 75 SASR 1 [1999] SASC 265 Debelle and Wicks JJ at [625]; 
Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 Edelman J at [310]. 
26 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 Edelman J at [331].  
27 This article does not discuss the State-based protections that may also be available, for example, relief from 
unjust contracts under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). 
28 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 Mason J at 467.  
29 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 467 (Mason J) 474 (Deane J “that 
disability was sufficiently evident to the stronger party…”). 
30 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 J Forrest J at [194]. 
31 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 J Forrest J at [194]. 
32 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 J Forrest J at [194].  
33 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 Mason J at 462. 
34 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 Mason J at 466-467. 
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Once those elements are established, the onus passes to the stronger party to establish that the 
entry into the contract in the circumstances was fair, just and reasonable..35 A contract is less 
likely to be fair, just and reasonable if the benefit of the consideration goes to a third party.36  
 
 
The statutory remedy  
 
The ASIC Act in Part 2 Division 2 deals with unconscionable conduct and consumer 
protection in relation to financial services.37 Subdivision C is headed “Unconscionable 
Conduct” and comprises three provisions. First, s 12CA prohibits a person, in trade or 
commerce, from engaging in conduct that is unconscionable within the meaning of the 
unwritten law, from time to time, of the States and Territories. The provision makes the 
remedies under the ASIC Act available where unconscionable conduct has occurred.  
 
The other provisions, ss 12 CB and 12 CC, appear to expand the scope of the concept of 
unconscionability. Section 12CB provides that a person must not, in trade or commerce, in 
connection with the supply or possible supply of financial services to a person (other than a 
listed public company), engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. 
When a borrower enters a contract for the lending of money, they acquire a financial 
service.38 Matters that a court may consider to determine whether there was unconscionable 
conduct are set out in s12CC (1). These include matters relevant to procedural unfairness39 
and to substantive unconscionability, 40 including whether each party acted in good faith, 
which makes moral fault relevant. 41  
 
These statutory provisions were amended in 2012 to remove the distinction between 
“consumer” unconscionability and “business” unconscionability. Previously s 12 CB and s 12 
CC were limited in their application - s 12 CB to the supply of financial services “of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal domestic or household use” (subs (5))42 and s 12 CC to the 
                                                 
35 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 Deane J at 474, 479. 
36 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 475 (Deane J). 
37 Broadly, a person provides a financial service if they provide financial product advice or deal in financial 
products: s 12BAB ASIC Act. A “credit facility” (within the meaning of the regulations) is defined to be a 
financial product: s12BAA (7) (k). The Australian Securities and Investments Commission Regulations 2001 
provide that a mortgage that secures obligations under a credit contract  (f) is a credit facility: Regulation 2B(1).  
The Regulations define ‘credit’ broadly to mean a contract, arrangement or understanding under which payment 
of a debt owed by one person (a debtor) to another person (a credit provider) is deferred or one person (a debtor) 
incurs a deferred debt to another person (a credit provider): Regulation 2B(3).  The practical effect is that a loan 
of money and/or a mortgage given to secure repayment, are within the ASIC Act, since credit is a “financial 
product” and the provision of credit is the supply of a “financial service”.  
38 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 Campbell JA at [182] with whom Hodgson and 
McColl JJA agreed, wrote that they acquire a service within the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 51AC, 
from which this provision was derived; see also Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [284].  
39 such as relative strengths of bargaining power (subpara (a)); the ability to understand any relevant documents 
(subpara (c)); and the exertion of undue influence or pressure or use of unfair tactics (subpara (d)). 
40 such as the inclusion of conditions that are not reasonably necessary for the protection of the supplier’s 
legitimate interests (subpara (b)), and the amount for which and circumstances under which the debtor could 
have acquired identical or equivalent services from another person: (e).  
41 Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt (2013) 300 ALR 770 at 782-3 [50]- [51]; [2013] VSCA 56 at [50]- 
[51]. 
42 But a borrower for purposes within the scope of the National Credit Code would seek the greater remedies 
provided there. 
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supply of financial services acquired for the purpose of trade or commerce43 and for a limited 
price.44 The s 12 CC limitation had meant that a loan to a private individual or a private 
individual’s company to make an investment was not “for the purposes of trade or 
commerce”, when it was not itself a part of a business of investing.45 Section 12 CB now 
covers all loans, irrespective of their purpose. 46  
 
The statutory provision is wider than the equitable doctrine.47 Significantly, relief under the 
statute does not depend on there being any disadvantage that affects the ability of the 
borrower to make a judgment about his/her own best interests, 48 or on the financial services 
provider knowing anything of the other party’s circumstances49 or on taking advantage of a 
special disability.50  As well, they include references to “undue influence or pressure” which 
are regarded as different from unconscionable conduct.51 They appear to permit relief from 
contracts which are unfair in their operation52 despite the absence of any unfairness in the 
bargaining process, which is the concern of the equitable doctrine.  
 
Nevertheless, to establish to establish conduct by a financial services provider that is 
unconscionable under this statute, it is necessary to prove a “high level of moral obloquy”53 
or conduct contrary to good conscience.54  The focus is on the conduct of the person said to 
have acted unconscionably. 55 It has been said that whether the test of a “high level of moral 
                                                 
43  s 12CC(6) 
44  s 12 CC (8) and (9). The limit of $3,000,000 was later increased to $10,000,000 by the Trade Practices 
Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2007 
45 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 Campbell JA at [188] with whom Hodgson and 
McColl JJA agreed. 
46 In Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389, the Court commented that the 
question of how to characterise whether financial services were ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use was not straightforward. Lo doc loans for the purchase or refinance of a home or investment 
property or to access equity for personal or investment reasons were to some degree for business use and to 
some degree personal: [296] - [297]. Ordinarily they were for the personal use of investment or retirement 
saving: at [298]. The court did not have to decide this because its conclusion was that no unconscionable 
conduct had occurred. This approach was followed in Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt (2013) 300 ALR 
770 at [75]; [2013] VSCA 56 where the court wrote the financial services provided to Mr Schmidt were of a 
kind ordinarily acquired for personal use, despite the borrower having declared that the credit was to be applied 
wholly or predominantly for business or investment purposes: at [75]. Investments can be personal. It is 
common for retirees to borrow funds to use in investment projects. The advertisement to which Mr Schmidt 
responded was headed “Retirees/Investors/ Superannuation.”  The type of low doc loan obtained by Mr Schmidt 
was available only if the security property was residential with a loan to value ratio of 80% and the maximum 
amount that could be borrowed was $600,000. Ordinarily that type of loan would be for personal investment 
rather than for the operation of an investment business. So the loan would fall within s 12CB(5): at [75]. 
47 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [291]; Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v 
Schmidt (2013) 300 ALR 770 at [80]; [2013] VSCA 56 at [80]. 
48 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 J Forrest J at [190] - [191]; Perpetual Trustee Co 
Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 184 [301]; Tonto Home Loans  Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares 
[2011] NSWCA 389 at [291]. 
49 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 Mason J at 467, Deane J at 477. 
50 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victorial Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [88].    
51    Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 Mason J at 461, Deane J at 474. 
52 S 12 CC (2) (b), (e). 
53   Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victorial Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [97];  Tonto Home Loans  
Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [288], [291] - [292]; Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v 
Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 J Forrest J at [206], Permanent Mortgages Pty Ltd v Vandenbergh [2010] WASC 10 at 
[364]-[365]; Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2)  (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 188 [323] - [326]. 
54 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 J Forrest J at [206], [207].  
55 Tonto Home Loans  Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [291]. 
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obloquy”56 is too stringent and whether “significant” or “real” may be preferable, need not be 
decided. What is required is some degree of moral tainting in the transaction of a kind that 
permits the opprobrium of unconscionability to characterise the conduct of the party.57 This 
has proved to be a major limitation. This may be explored by the Review of Competition 
Laws which will include consideration of the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) and the corresponding provisions in the ASIC 
Act, to the extent they relate to protections from unfair and unconscionable conduct for small 
businesses.58 
 
 
The fact that a loan is asset based is not sufficient to make it unconscionable – there must be 
some other factors to make the conduct of the lender in relation to its dealings (including the 
processing of the loan application) with the borrower, morally repugnant. 59  
 
So both the statutory provision and the equitable doctrine have in common the need to 
establish conduct by a financial services provider that is morally repugnant or, at the least, 
involves moral fault. 60 This means that unless there is some serious wrongdoing by the party 
seeking to uphold a contract, the contract will be enforceable.  
 
 
Classification of the cases 
 
Identifying which circumstances make lending unconscionable, on the present state of the 
authorities, is largely an exercise in cataloguing the situations where the claims have 
succeeded or failed. The cases also shed light on the position of intermediaries which will be 
discussed in Part Two.   
 
 
Cases where the borrowers succeeded 
 
Of the thirteen cases to be reviewed, borrowers succeeded in only four. In none of these was 
there any personal contact between borrowers and lender.61 
 
 
 Teachers Health v Wynne (unreported NSWCA, 1996, BC 9603022).  
                                                 
56 enunciated by Spigelman CJ in Attorney General (NSW) v World Best Holdings Ltd [2005] NSWCA 261 at 
583 [121] 
57 Tonto Home Loans  Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [293]; Perpetual Trustee v Burniston 
(No 2)  (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 188 at [324] - [325]. 
58 www.australian competitionlaw.org 
59 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 J Forrest J at [200]. 
60 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 J Forrest J at [196], [206]. 
61 In Teachers Health v Wynne (unreported NSWCA, 1996, BC 9603022) the lender acted through its solicitors 
and the principal debtor acted through a broker and solicitors: BC 9603022 at 6, 24, 26. In Elkofairi v 
Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20,841 the loan application was made to Aussie Home Loans and 
processed through Qld State Home Loans [18], while the lender acted though its solicitors. They forwarded the 
contract to the borrowers at their home [27] and their signatures were witnessed by their solicitor: [28]. In Small 
v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 the lender acted through agents, La Trobe [19] who received the loan application 
from the Loan Enquiry Centre Pty Ltd [17] and instructed solicitors, who then obtained a certificate of legal 
advice from a solicitor Mr Trimarchi [96]. The Loan Enquiry Centre commissioned an accountant’s certificate 
of ability to repay the loan [55]. See also Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [3]. 
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This concerned a wife’s mortgage of the family home, of which she was the sole registered 
owner, as security for her husband’s business debts. For the equitable doctrine, she was held 
to have been in a vulnerable emotional state due to marital difficulties62 which made her 
unable to judge for herself the providence of the transaction,63 and her will had been 
overborne.64 This was not known to the lender as there was no personal contact. 65  
 
Although the wife was listed as a borrower in the husband’s application for a loan, no 
financial information for her was provided,66 nor had she signed the application.67 The court 
found that the loan application was made by the husband only.68 The accountant’s letter in 
support gave information about the husband’s financial circumstances only.69  
 
The court held that the husband’s application for a loan of $450,000 to “refinance” his 
existing debts (of about $140,000)70 contained enough information for the lender to realise 
that the husband could not afford to repay the loan or service the interest due to his low 
salary.71 Although he claimed he could draw funds from a company, its accounts revealed an 
inability to support such drawings. 72A “reasonable, careful lender” should have been aware 
from the “inconsistencies in the financial material” that the mortgage was improvident for the 
wife. 73 The lender should have been on notice that the transaction was perilous from the 
husband’s point of view, which must have meant there was a substantial risk, or a probability, 
of default and the loss of the home.74    
 
From this, the lender ought to have realised that his wife, in giving the mortgage, must have 
lacked knowledge of her husband’s financial circumstances and so been unable to judge for 
herself that the transaction was improvident.75 In those circumstances the lender should have 
at least advised the wife to obtain financial advice as to the debtor’s financial circumstances 
and about the propriety of the transaction.76 The lender’s failure to so advise her made its 
conduct unconscionable.77 The mortgage was set aside under the equitable doctrine.78  
 
This was a significant decision, as its basis was that the lender, without in fact knowing of the 
wife’s constitutional disadvantage, should have realised that any person who entered such an 
improvident transaction must have been at a disadvantage and unable to make a satisfactory 
assessment for herself.   
                                                 
62 BC 9603022 at 23, 24. 
63 BC 9603022 at 27. 
64 BC 9603022 at 23. 
65 and there was no finding that the lender ought to have known of her particular disadvantage. 
66 Teachers Health v Wynne (unreported NSWCA, 1996, BC 9603022) at 7, 14 
67 BC 9603022 at 8 
68 BC 9603022 at 15. 
69 Teachers Health v Wynne (unreported NSWCA, 1996, BC 9603022 at 8, 14. 
70 BC9603022 at 2. 
71 BC 9603022 at 25. 
72 BC 9603022 at 25.   
73 BC9603022 at 27.   
74 BC9603022 at 26. 
75 BC9603022 at 27. 
76 BC 9603022 at 27 
77 BC 9603022 at 28. 
78 The trial judge had found the wife would not have entered into the transaction at all if she had known the truth 
about her husband’s financial circumstances and so the mortgage was set aside in its entirety: BC 9603022 at 36. 
At trial the mortgage was set aside under the presumption in Yerkey v Jones (1940) 63 CLR 649, but 
unconscionability was rejected.  On appeal, Yerkey v Jones was held to no longer apply.  
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 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841.  
A husband and wife applied for a loan of approximately $750,000, stating that the purpose 
was to refinance their existing home loan (approximately $470,000) and to obtain additional 
funds for business/investment.79    The husband’s loan application disclosed assets of $1.2 
million (the home) and one debt only - the existing mortgage debt 80 but did not show any 
income for either the husband or the wife.81 The loan application also revealed that they were 
in their fifties, with only 5 years’ experience in business.82 The application sought 40% of the 
loan for business or investment purposes but gave no information as to the nature of the 
business to be undertaken, what income it was likely to generate, whether the loan was to 
purchase an existing business or establish a new one, or whether some form of investment 
was involved.83 The husband’s accountant wrote letters supporting the application but gave 
no details of the husband’s financial position and did not refer to the wife’s position.84 He did 
not set out any particulars of the basis on which the husband would service the loan. In fact 
the husband and wife and were in default under their existing mortgage 85  and had failed to 
honour a debt reduction arrangement for their taxation debts. 86 
 
Knowledge of their lack of income meant the lender ought to have been aware that the wife 
lacked capacity to meet the repayment obligations87 and that left the sale of her only asset as 
the only source of repayment.88  There was “both immediate and real” risk that the wife 
would lose her home.89  The lender also knew the wife had no legal advice in respect of the 
mortgage.90 In the circumstances, it was unconscientious for the lender to lend money on the 
security of the wife’s only asset.91 The special disadvantage arose from the circumstances of 
the transaction and consisted of a large borrowing secured over her only asset where she had 
no income.92 It was no answer for the lender to say that it was content with the transaction 
because the loan was well secured. Teachers Health v Wynne was followed.93  The mortgage 
was set aside under the equitable doctrine, although account was taken of the benefit received 
by the wife, which was payment of one-half of the amount owed under the previous 
mortgage. 94 
 
 Small v Gray  [2004] NSWSC 97.  
                                                 
79 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [17] – [18].   
80 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [19] 
81 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [19]. Mrs Elkofairi was an invalid pensioner: 
[12], [25].  The loan application form did not reveal this, but failed to disclose any income for her.  There were 
several other factors of special disadvantage of the wife, but the lender was not aware of them: [53].  
82 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [48].   
83 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [54]] 
84 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [23], [55].    
85 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [81] 
86 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [24] 
87 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [55], [56] 
88 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [56]; see also the summary of this decision in 
Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 at [96]. 
89 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [57]. 
90 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [27][55].  
91 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [57] 
92 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [56] 
93 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [60]; Beazley JA wrote the principal 
judgment in both cases. 
94 Beazley JA at [80] -[86], Santow JA at [110]; Campbell AJA agreed with both. 
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A mother mortgaged her home, her only asset, as collateral security for a loan to her son and 
his wife to purchase a home.95  The son and wife went into default on the loan and their 
property was sold, but there was a shortfall. 
 
The court examined what the lender had learned through the application for mortgage 
finance:  the mother was unemployed and had no income to service the loan;96 her home was 
her only asset;97 she received no benefit from the transaction, other than to assist her son;98 
and her role was in substance as guarantor.99 The lender’s valuation revealed there was no 
equity in that home100 so if the son and his wife defaulted, it was very likely that the mother’s 
home would have to be sold.101 The son and his wife had both been bankrupt.102  
 
There was, however, no finding that default was certain or even likely, merely that the lender 
had no reason to be confident that the son and his wife could service the loan, and knew that 
the mother could not.  Therefore the lender ought to have known that the risk of loss to the 
mother was real, and that that would involve the loss of her home and only substantial 
asset.103  
There was a significant discrepancy in the accountant’s certificate which implied that the 
mother had the capacity to meet her obligations, and the application for mortgage finance, 
which stated that she had no income, which the lender had not investigated.104  
 
The court proceeded on the basis that unconscionable conduct may be demonstrated  from the 
circumstances in which, to the knowledge of the lender, the transaction is entered, coupled 
with the nature of the transaction.105 in view of what the lender they knew about the position 
of the mother, it was unconscionable for them to lend only on the basis that they were well 
secured.106    
 
The court ordered that the mortgage not be enforced against the mother; as she had not 
received any benefit, she did not have to do any equity.107    
 
 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67.  
Mr Schmidt was retired and in receipt of Centrelink benefits.108 He was induced by one 
Maddocks to borrow $190,000 to invest in a syndicate engaged in property developments109 
which turned out to be worthless, with Maddocks obtaining the money.  
 
                                                 
95 The son and his wife had signed a s11 declaration that the purpose of the loan was business or investment, and 
the case proceeded on the basis that the Consumer Credit Code did not apply. Instead the mother sought relief 
on the basis that the transaction was unconscionable under the general law and under the Contracts Review Act 
1980 (NSW).  
96 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [92], [96] 
97 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [92] [96]. 
98 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [99], [100] 
99 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [100]. 
100 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [92], [97]. 
101Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [92], [103] 
102 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [102] 
103 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [101], [102] 
104 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [111] 
105 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [108] 
106 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [114] 
107 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [115] 
108 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [9]. 
109 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [10], [67] - [71] 
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Mr Schmidt borrowed from Perpetual by a low doc loan110 secured by a mortgage over his 
home. Maddocks had prepared two documents, a loan application and an income declaration, 
the borrower signed them, and Maddocks provided them to a finance broker.111 The 
documents asserted differing amounts of income,112 and although both claimed self-
employment as a painter, neither disclosed an ABN.113  The finance broker lodged them with 
a mortgage originator, whose officer queried the inconsistency. 114  
 
The finance broker responded by preparing a new set of documents, altering the income 
disclosed for the borrower, to ensure the loan application complied with the lender’s 
requirements.115 The broker’s conduct was held to be unconscionable,116 but its conduct could 
not be attributed to the lender, as it was held not to be the lender’s agent.117   
The conduct of the mortgage originator was also held to be unconscionable.118 The originator 
knew the finance broker had made false statements about the borrower’s income in the loan 
application and had participated in the broker’s “fudging” the figures.119 The originator also 
was aware the loan was secured over the borrower’s only asset120 and that the borrower did 
not have the income to service the loan, as statements of a prior loan account showed that for 
some time it had been serviced by advances on that account rather than by payments by the 
borrower.121  The originator knew the borrower’s age from his passport.122   
The discrepancies in the documents and the knowledge of the borrower’s circumstances put 
the originator on enquiry. 123 Despite this, the originator failed to interview the borrower to 
confirm the claim of self-employment and other details of the application; this was 
reprehensible in the circumstances. 124 The originator was held to have wilfully turned a blind 
eye to its suspicions..125 Instead of complying with the lending guidelines and making 
inquiries to see if there was a satisfactory explanation, it processed the altered application and 
sent the documents on to the lending program manager who approved the loan on the basis of 
the false information.126  
                                                 
110 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [23]. 
111 Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [15]. 
112 The loan application claimed an income of $75000 but the income declaration claimed $65000. Perpetual 
Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [94] 
113 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67  at [77], [95] 
114 Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [16]- [17]. 
115 The new loan application and income declaration claimed income of $49000 which was below the ABN 
threshold: Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [88] - [89], [94].  
116 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [214] 
117 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [132]. 
118 and to have been  more culpable than that of the originator in Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares 
[2011] NSWCA 389 due to its knowledge of false information in the loan application which Tonto HL did not 
have: Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [59].   
119 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [88]- [89], [94] - [96], [98], [198]; Violet Home 
Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [62]. 
120 Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [66]; Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt 
[2010] VSC 67 at [209]. 
121 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [33], [86], [198] 
122 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [249] 
123 Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [59], [68]. 
124 Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [32], [64] - [65], [68]  
125 Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [58]- [59], [62]. 
126 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [209]; Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt 
[2013] VSCA 56 at [24], [32], [62]. 
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The originator was held to be the agent of the lender, so its conduct and knowledge could be 
attributed to the lender. The originator’s conduct was held to be morally repugnant asset 
lending, and unconscionable conduct contrary to the ASIC Act. 127  The loan contract and 
mortgage were set aside, except for the amount used to pay out the borrower’s previous 
loan.128  
 
 
 
 
Cases where the borrowers failed 
 
These cases also provide guidance as to the limits of the concept of unconscionability, both 
under the equitable doctrine, and under statute.  They can be considered together on the basis 
of some common features, but each of them deals with a number of relevant circumstances. 
 
Borrowers misrepresented their financial position and/or the purpose of the loan 
 
Situations have arisen where the material provided to the lender as to the financial position of 
the borrower has been falsified so as to make it appear that the borrower has the income 
necessary to service the loan.  If this is done by the borrower personally, courts have had no 
difficulty in rejecting allegations of unconscionability.  Borrowers cannot complain if they 
are in difficulties because they misrepresented their financial position. This is illustrated by 
three cases. 
 
 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55; [2008] NSWCA 343  
 
The borrower entered into two short term loans at high rates of interest for investment 
purposes at the instigation of a fraudster, who obtained the funds, ostensibly for on-lending to 
“investors”, and disappeared with them.  Since the fraudster always intended to defraud the 
borrower and his “investors” did not exist, it was inevitable that this loan would fall into 
default.  The borrower first mortgaged his investment property in Berowra, to obtain a loan of 
$320,000, making false statements about his income in both his loan application and his loan 
ability repayment declaration.129  Neither the lender nor its officer had any reason to doubt 
the truth of these claims.  After this loan was in default, despite knowing that the fraudster’s 
promises of repayment being made by “the investors” had not been met, and the fraudster’s 
refusal to identify “the investors,” he agreed to borrow further moneys. A company he 
controlled borrowed a further sum of $807,000, secured by first mortgage over a property it 
owned which was used as the family home, and by a guarantee by the borrower. Since the 
                                                 
127 The trial judge found unconscionable conduct under s 12CB ASIC Act (as at 2009) Perpetual Trustees 
Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [213]; this was upheld on appeal: Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v 
Schmidt (2013) 300 ALR 770 [53]- [69].  The trial judge also found unconscionable conduct under the general 
law and under s 51AC Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth): Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 
67 at [213].  On appeal, the Court did not need to decide whether that was correct, as the equitable concept of 
unconscionability was narrower than statutory unconscionability: [2013] VSCA 56 at [80].  It was also 
unnecessary to decide whether Mr Schmidt acquired the financial services for the purposes of trade or 
commerce [2013] VSCA 56 at [76] -[77]. 
128 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [233], [236]. 
129  Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55; [2008] NSWCA 343 at [40], [43], [50].  He 
claimed income of $100,000 per year whereas his income was $45,000. 
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fraudster arranged this loan, the borrower did not complete a loan application, but he did sign 
a loan ability repayment declaration making the same false claim about his income.130  
 
The court considered what was known to the lender’s officer concerning each transaction. In 
entering into the Berowra loan transaction, there was no reason for the lender to doubt the 
false information the fraudster gave, that the borrower was a developer,131 or to suspect that 
the fraudster was dishonest132 or was intending to defraud the borrower.133  In his loan 
application, the borrower identified “bank refinance” as the “plan for repayment.”134 The 
lender had no reason to doubt the borrower could refinance, so the lender did not know there 
was a high risk of failure.135  Interest for the loan was deducted from the sum advanced, so 
the only issue about servicing the loan was the ability to repay it. The lender did not know 
that there was a high risk of default. 136 
 
The borrower had previous experience of having mortgaged properties to secure repayment 
of loans, and understood the nature of a guarantee.137   He had signed an acknowledgement of 
independent legal advice,138 and, so far as the lender was concerned, had received advice 
from his solicitor. The trial judge found the borrower was not under a special disability in 
dealing with the lender, and that this was not unconscionable asset lending.139   This was 
confirmed on appeal. 140  The Court commented that a lender is not bound to carry out a 
detailed investigation of the practicality of a borrower’s plan for repayment of the loan.141   
 
 
 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450  
 
The borrowers entered into a “fastdoc” loan142 of $600,0000 for the purpose of speculative 
property investment in nine townhouses.143 They were induced to do this by a fraudster 
associated with the property developer, introduced by their son, who assured them the 
amount borrowed would cover interest payments until the loan was repaid from the proceeds 
of the property development.144  The loan money was paid to this fraudster; they obtained 
shares in a company owning the property development and units in a unit trust,145 but these 
were of no value.  Their claim that the loan was unconscionable, in that they incurred the debt 
and the obligation to pay interest without receiving any benefit, failed.146 
                                                 
130 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 [2008] NSWCA 343 at [57], [58].    
131 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [89].    
132 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [122] 
133 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [40] 
134 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [40].     
135 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [99] 
136 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [123] 
137 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [49] 
138 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [44] 
139 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [49] 
140 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [124] The court held however that the 
provisions for a higher rate of interest and compound interest on default were unjust under the Contracts Review 
Act 1980 (NSW) and unconscionable under s 43 of the Fair Trading Act 1987, matters separate from the issue 
of asset lending. 
141 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [99] 
142 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [15]. 
143 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [4]. 
144 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [45], [48]. 
145 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [5]. 
146 After they became aware that the fraudster had defaulted on his promise to pay interest on the loan with 
money from the amount borrowed which had been paid to him for this purpose and after the lender had got 
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The borrowers signed loan applications in blank, knowing that the fraudster would insert 
false information as to their income and the purpose of the loan.147   The loan application 
claimed the purpose of the loan was to refinance an existing loan of $600,000 to the Property 
Group under which they made monthly payments of $5000.148 This was false as there was no 
such loan.149  The application also claimed they were self-employed, had carried on a dry-
cleaning business for 10 years and had a gross income of $100,000 each.150 These claims 
were also false, as one borrower was employed, his wife was not working and their income 
was insufficient to meet repayments on a $600,000 loan. 151  The application sought a “lo 
doc” loan suitable for self-employed people who could not provide financial statements or 
income tax returns, available at a higher rate of interest. 152   
 
Once the loan was approved, the borrowers signed loan documents, including a “financial 
summary,” which required them to confirm their income details and stated that those details 
were used by the lender to assess their ability to meet their obligations. 153 The judge was 
satisfied both borrowers understood they were declaring they had a combined income of 
$200,000, so that the loan was being obtained by false statements to the lender about their 
income154 and the purpose.155  They were aware they did not have sufficient income to 
service the loan. 156  
 
The court accepted that the borrowers were in a position of special disadvantage, lacking  
education and being ill-equipped to understand the risks of the development.157  The court 
also held that the mortgage originator, as the agent of the lender, ought to have known of 
their special disadvantage, because it ought to have confirmed the details of their application 
with them, and would then have discovered the false representations.158  But that special 
disadvantage was in relation to the investment with the fraudster rather than the loan.159 Thus 
the mortgage originator did not have knowledge relevant to unconscionable conduct.  
 
The mortgage originator had breached the lending guidelines by not meeting with the 
borrowers to check their identity and verify their claims about self-employment.160  The 
                                                                                                                                                        
judgment for possession of their home, they took legal advice. Their solicitor advised them to commence 
proceedings but instead, at the instigation of this fraudster they took a second loan from another lender. They 
used this money to pay out the first loan, to pay $100000 to a company controlled by the fraudster and they 
retained the balance. They claimed this second loan was unjust under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). 
This article is concerned only with the claim of unconscionable conduct.  
147 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [34], [38], [45] -[46], [48]. 
148 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [17], [41]. 
149 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [17] 
150 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [17], [18], [41]. 
151 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [16]. 
152 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [15]. 
153 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [43]. 
154 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [45] 
155 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [48] 
156 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [43], [45]. 
157 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [91] 
158 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [92]; the agency of the mortgage 
originator is considered in Part Two.  
159 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [92] 
160 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [58], [71]. The lender’s claim 
against the originator was not breach of contract, but that the originator had itself made misrepresentations about 
the borrowers’ financial circumstances and purpose: at [72] - [74]. 
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mortgage originator made no inquiry to ascertain the truth of the financial information161 but 
that was not required by their contract with the lending program manager. 162 Where the loan 
was a refinancing, the lending guidelines required them to verify the existing loan and they 
accepted a letter from the fraudster concerning this, as did the lending program manager.163 
Although there were grounds for suspicion that the borrowers’ claim of an existing debt of 
$600,000 was false,164 the judge could not find the originator knew the loan application 
contained false representations about this,165 or their employment or income.166 
 
The conclusion was that the lender had not taken unconscientious advantage of the 
borrowers’ position, as the loan was at a commercial rate of interest with no disadvantageous 
conditions.167  Instead, the borrowers took advantage of the lender’s failure to investigate 
further, in order to mislead its agents about their financial position and the purpose of the 
loan.168   
 
The lender and its agents did not know that the financial details were false, and the fact that 
the lender required a declaration as to the borrowers’ ability to service the loan showed that it 
was not indifferent to their capacity to repay.169  The disclosed income, if correct, would have 
been sufficient to service the loan.170 It was not unconscionable for the lender to rely on its 
security as protection against the consequences of false information.171 The lender was not 
guilty of a high level of moral obloquy.172   
 
 
 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447    
A couple who operated an extensive farming operation borrowed two sums from the lender. 
First, through their broker, they borrowed $4.5 million, stating that their purpose was to repay 
their existing loan of $2.1 million (with Suncorp) with the balance for investment in a 
company, Skyder Investments.173  Skyder was associated with their broker174 who had 
represented they would get returns of 30%.175 When the Skyder investment failed, they 
obtained a second loan of $525000 to subdivide, develop and then sell part of their grazing 
property, but that project also failed.176  
 
In deciding that unconscionable conduct by the lender was not established for either loan,177 
the judge stressed that the borrowers had not dealt honestly with the lender. They misled the 
lender about their intentions from the outset, as they intended to keep $500000 of the loan for 
                                                 
161 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [69] 
162 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [69] 
163 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [71] 
164 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [61] - [64] 
165 Michalopoulos [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [64], [69]. 
166 Michalopoulos[2010] NSWSC 1450 at [74], [83] 
167 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [93]. 
168 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [94]. 
169 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [107]. 
170 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [105]. 
171 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [99], [106]. 
172 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [97]. 
173 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [30], [49]. 
174 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [29]. 
175 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [29]. 
176 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [13]. 
177 The borrowers’ claim that the loan contracts were unjust under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) also 
failed [120] - [125]. 
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themselves.178 They also had not disclosed to the lender their decision to pay Suncorp $2.3 
million, to invest only $1.6 million with Skyder, and to use the balance for personal and 
business purposes.179  
 
Before receiving this loan, the borrowers obtained finance of $1.1 million for the purchase of 
an additional property from other sources, which they did not disclose to the lender. 180 The 
borrowers led no evidence as to what effect this acquisition had on their financial position, of 
their current financial position or what happened to the money they invested with Skyder. 181 
 
The lender had imposed conditions182which included providing information about the 
investment from an independent financial adviser183 and taking a mortgage debenture over 
the assets of Skyder Investments as security for their loan. 184 The borrowers disregarded 
both, instead providing information from Skyder. 185  The borrowers invested in Skyder 
against their solicitor’s repeated advice.186 Their accountant declined to advise about the 
investment but suggested they seek other advice, which they did not do. 187  
 
The lender had assessed serviceability for both loans. 188 For the investment loan, the lender’s 
calculations revealed that if half the anticipated returns were achieved, the borrowers could 
service the loan.189  The loan for property development gave the borrowers the opportunity to 
overcome their financial difficulties by implementing their own property development 
proposal.190 There was no evidence that it should have been apparent to the lender that this 
development would fail.191 Here, sale of the asset was the intended source of funds for 
repayment of the loan. 192  The lender had not failed to comply with its lending guidelines. 193 
 
The borrowers were held to be not at a special disadvantage as against the lender as they were 
very experienced, successful operators of an extensive farming operation.194  They decided to 
embark on a highly speculative investment against expert advice to try and achieve a high 
return.195 They knew that they could not service the investment loan without returns from the 
Skyder investment and voluntarily took the risk of failure. 196 The sophistication of the 
property development proposal they put forward to obtain the second loan demonstrated they 
were not relying on the lender.197 The lender had not taken unconscientious advantage of the 
borrowers in making either loan. 198  
                                                 
178 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [30]. 
179 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [49], [51], [92], [106], [140]. 
180  Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [11]. 
181 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [55], [56], [91], [139] 
182 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [32], [71]. 
183 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [33], [41], [51], [88]. 
184 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at 35], [44]- [45]. 
185 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [104] 
186 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [9], [37], [39]. 
187 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [40]- [41], [62].   
188 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at 103]-[105]. 
189 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [79], [83], [105]. 
190 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at 135] 
191 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [109], [135]-[136].   
192 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [112].   
193 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [61], [62], [92].   
194 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [30]. 
195 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [128], [134]. 
196 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 [103], [137] 
197 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [132] 
198 Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [135] 
17 
 
 
Misrepresentations by the borrower’s son and his agent 
In one case the misrepresentations were made by the borrower’s son, and his accountant, in a 
situation where the loan was for the benefit of the son, and so in substance was a 
guarantee.199   
In Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265200 two sets of parents of a husband (Mr 
and Mrs Bechara) and a wife (Mr and Mrs Micarone), and the wife’s sister, joined in a loan 
of $640,000 secured by mortgages over their homes to support businesses being controlled by 
the husband (Tony Bechara). All parents sought to establish that the lender had engaged in 
unconscionable conduct in making the loan.  
For each set of parents, this loan was the last in a series of borrowing transactions to assist 
their children with their business.201  This was the second refinancing of previous loans;202 
the purpose was to reduce interest payments to avoid default pending the recovery of a fire 
insurance claim. The son and his accountant had deceived them into believing the insurance 
claim would be successful.203  The parents had been induced to enter into the transaction by 
the false representations of the son and his accountant that the business was sound and 
trading well whereas in fact it was not producing enough income to pay the loan. 204 
The accountant made similar false representations about the turnover of the business in the 
loan application.205 The parents unwittingly were party to the misrepresentations as to 
turnover. A party cannot claim to be relieved of its obligations when it gave misleading 
information to a proposed lender and then relied on the failure of the lender to investigate the 
information provided.206 The lender’s agent Puma did not know the turnover claims were 
false207 but relied on them208 and did not know of any default in paying existing lenders.209  
The lender’s agent, through three officers, had assessed serviceability against Perpetual’s 
lending criteria. 210  On its face, the application showed substantial income sufficient to 
service the loan.211    
 
                                                 
199 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [621] 
200  Full Court of South Australia, Debelle and Wicks JJ, Olssen J dissenting. The High Court refused 
special leave to appeal, 12 May 2000: [2000] HCA Trans 225.  
201 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [562] 
202 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [481] 
203 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [570] The accountant was held liable to the parents for 
damages for deceit. 
204 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [566] 
205 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [609] 
206 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [624] 
207 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [616] 
208 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [616] 
209 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [626] 
210 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [612]-[614], [617]. 
211 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [625] 
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IF&I, which carried on business as a finance broker, but was also a mortgagor originator and 
manager, had submitted the loan application to the lender’s agent.  IF&I knew that two other 
lenders had refused the loan application. This knowledge could have been relevant to whether 
the lender ought to have known of a special disability claimed by the parents for the equitable 
doctrine.212 The majority judges held that when IF&I acquired the knowledge, it was acting 
as a finance broker213 and was not the agent of the lender, so its knowledge could not be 
attributed to the lender. In any event the borrowers were found not to have been under a 
disability as against the lender’s agent, Puma. This was due to their financial experience, their 
understanding, financial explanations and independent legal advice they had received.214  
 
As far as the lender’s agent was concerned, this was a standard application for finance. On 
receipt of an apparently satisfactory loan application, there is no obligation on a lender to 
pursue detailed inquiries as to the borrowers’ circumstances or the proposed business 
transaction.215   
The lender had not engaged in unconscionable conduct in making this loan.  Although a very 
substantial, this was an ordinary commercial loan, made on usual terms, and was more 
advantageous than their previous loan, as monthly repayments were greatly reduced. 216 The 
security was the same as for previous loans.217 The lender did nothing which deprived the 
borrowers of a real choice to enter into the transaction, the terms of which were reasonable.218   
 
Misrepresentations/ misconduct by intermediaries between the borrower and the lender. 
 
If the misrepresentation has been made by an intermediary, without the knowledge of the 
borrower or the lender, whether the lender must take responsibility for the conduct of the 
intermediary depends on ordinary principles of agency. This occurred in Perpetual Trustees 
Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 and in two other cases:   
 
 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389.219   
Three cases where borrowers obtained loans to enter joint venture agreements220 for the 
purchase of an investment property with a property developer, Streetwise Property, were 
heard together. The lender “of record, fulfilling a custodial function” to the O’Donnells and 
                                                 
212 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [629] 
213 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at  [638] 
214 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [595] - [596] 
215 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [625] 
216 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 Debelle and Wicks JJ at [649]. 
217 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [649] - [650]. 
218 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [650]. 
219  Allsop P with whom Bathurst CJ and Campbell JA agreed; entitled Permanent Trustee v O’Donnell  
(2009) 15 BPR 28,201 at first instance). 
220 The scheme involved partnering Streetwise in a joint venture building project, splitting the profits on sale and 
buying or building a second property as an investment property [2011] NSWCA 389 at [12], [18]. 
19 
 
the Di Benedettos was Permanent Trustee Company Ltd, with a bank providing the funds.221  
The lender to the third couple, Mr Tavares and Ms Rowe, was Tonto Home Loans Australia 
Pty Ltd (described as Tonto HLA) as part of the First Mac Program.222 Neither lender had 
any direct dealings with the borrowers.  
Under both programs, Tonto Home Loans Limited (Tonto HL)223 was a mortgage originator/ 
mortgage manager and was delegated authority to assess the loan applications and make the 
credit decisions on lending.224 A finance broker, Streetwise Loans, which was related to the 
property developer, engaged in a scheme to obtain “lo doc” loans of approximately $500,000 
for the borrowers from the lenders. The property developer obtained the loan moneys, with 
the borrowers obtaining no financial benefit from their investment.225 The borrowers were 
unemployed or did not have sufficient income to service the loans but had sufficient equity in 
their family homes to meet the LVR requirements of the loans.226 
The finance broker inserted false information as to the borrowers’ assets, income and 
employment in their loan applications without their knowledge and made representations to 
them that there was little risk because Streetwise Property would pay most of the mortgage 
instalments.227 The finance broker knew the true financial position of each borrower and that 
the loan was improvident for them.228 Streetwise Loans therefore knew that this was asset 
lending, and that the only manner in which the loans could be repaid was by the sale of the 
borrowers’ only asset, their family homes. 229 This was held to be unconscionable conduct by 
it. 230  
The court had to consider whether the lender had engaged in unconscionable conduct under 
the ASIC Act 231 in making these loans and taking mortgages over the borrowers’ family 
homes. The issue was whether Tonto HL, which was conceded to be the lender’s agent,232 
had engaged in statutory unconscionable conduct. Two ways were possible.  The first was 
that Streetwise was the agent of Tonto so the conduct and knowledge of Streetwise could be 
                                                 
221 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [92]; this Origin program was a 
“residential mortgage origination program” at [108]. 
222 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [91].  
223 Tonto HL should not be confused with the lender Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd.  
224 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [93], [95], [143], [180]. 
225 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [96], [127], [185]. 
226 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [120]- [121], [147], [151], [250] 
227 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [12], [19], [57], [70], [73], [87], 
[148]. 
228 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [147], [150] - [151]. 
229 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [147]. 
230 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [287]. 
231 The lender’s conduct was held unjust and the loans contracts set aside or varied substantially under the 
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). The loans were held unjust as against Tonto and Permanent because Tonto 
was responsible for the business structure which entrusted all information gathering to Streetwise. It was 
reasonably foreseeable that Streetwise had an incentive to have loans approved because they were a source of 
funds for its property development company. So there was an inherent or systemic risk of fraud in this structure. 
The only clear safeguards were the lending guidelines, and Tonto disregarded them in a way that reflected lack 
of concern for serviceability and suitability of customers. The relief was to set aside the contracts of 3 borrowers 
entirely [277], but one set of borrowers were relieved of only ¾ of the financial consequences because their 
decision was more an exercise of free will than the others, and they chose not to make use of their legal and 
financial advisers: [279] – [280].  Special leave to appeal was refused: [2012] HCA Trans 165.  
232 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [143], [180]. 
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attributed or imputed to Tonto.  This was resolved against the borrowers, with Streetwise 
being held not to be the agent of Tonto HL.233 The second was that the way Tonto conducted 
its business with Streetwise amounted to statutory unconscionable conduct on its part.  
In terms of Tonto’s own conduct, it did not know of the fraud practised on the borrowers,234 
or that information on the loan application was false.  Tonto HL had exposed the borrowers 
to the risk of fraud, as it knew of the close association between Streetwise and the developer, 
and that the purpose of the loan was for investment in the developer.235 This created a risk of 
non-compliance with lending guidelines and the provision of unreliable information in lo doc 
loan applications.236   This risk was heightened by Tonto’s agreeing with Streetwise not to 
contact the borrowers direct, thus removing the possibility of checking their financial 
information.237  This made it easier for the fraud of Streetwise to remain undetected.238 As 
well, Tonto failed to make other searches and inquiries required by its lending guidelines and 
prudent practice.239  This showed a lack of regard for the borrowers’ capacity to repay, other 
than by the sale of their homes.240  
 
But this was held not sufficient to amount to the “high” or “significant” or “real” degree of 
moral obloquy required for a finding of unconscionable conduct. 241 Without some finding of 
knowledge or complicity in the fraud of Streetwise, that level was not reached.242  There was 
no moral tainting in the transaction 243 
 
 
 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) [2012] WASC 383244 
 
This case also concerned a claim that a lender was responsible for unconscionable conduct 
under the ASIC Act.245  Two kinds of unconscionable conduct were raised.  The first was 
done by a director of a finance broking company, acting alone.246 She persuaded the 
borrowers to sell their existing house and invest most of the proceeds with her, and obtain a 
more expensive house with the aid of a loan arranged by her, on the basis that the returns on 
that investment would be sufficient to repay the loan.247 As a result of this, the borrowers 
invested $235,000 with the director, and then borrowed about $345,000, with which they 
bought a new home, subject to a mortgage to the lender.248 The investment money was lost, 
                                                 
233 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [191] - [195]; discussed in Part 2 of 
this article. 
234 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [137], [264], [292] – [293]. 
235 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [134], [202], [230], [234].   
236 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [134] 
237 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [133], [226], [229]. 
238 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [128] 
239 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [123], [124], [128] 
240 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [123] - [124], [250], [259], [291]-
[292].   
241 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [292].   
242 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [250], [292], [293].   
243 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at  [292] - [293. 
244  Reported as A v B1 and Another (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122; referred to as “Burniston”. 
245 The borrowers’ misplaced trust in the director of a finance broking company did not establish they were 
under a special disability for the equitable doctrine: Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 
FLR 122 at 184 [300]. 
246 referred to in the judgment as “the broker” 
247 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [24]- [28], [66], 164 [191]. 
248 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 140 [66]. 
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and the borrowers could not repay the loan. The director’s conduct in eliciting the $235,000 
from the borrowers for investment was held to be unconscionable, 249 but was not conduct 
“for or on behalf of” the finance broking company,250 and so could not be attributed even to 
the finance broking company or to the lender. 
Then the finance broking company itself engaged in unconscionable conduct, through the 
conduct of the director and another officer.251  This consisted of making false representations 
in the loan application: that the loan was for a business or investment purpose being the 
purchase of an investment house whereas the borrowers intended to live in the house;252 that 
the borrowers were self-employed and had substantial savings whereas they were pensioners 
and that they were resident at the broker’s address. 253  This was done by the director because 
she knew that without such information the application would be rejected.254  The false 
information was added after the borrowers signed the loan application.255  The director also 
procured the borrowers’ execution of the loan and mortgage documents in a procedurally 
unfair manner.256  These actions, particularly in combination, amounted to unconscionable 
conduct by the finance broking company.257  The finance broking company was held not to 
be the agent of the originator and so this unconscionable conduct could not be attributed to 
the originator or lender:258 see Part Two.  
Then the court considered whether the originator had engaged in unconscionable conduct. It 
was common ground that the originator was the agent of the lender. 259 There the originator 
was held to be in the equivalent position to Tonto HL in the Streetwise litigation. 260  
 
There was no allegation that the originator had actual knowledge that information in the 
borrowers’ loan application was false.261 The court accepted that the originator had been 
careless and breached its lending guidelines in not checking the accuracy of information in 
the borrowers’ loan application,262 not noticing that the address given for the borrowers 
indicated that other information in the loan application must have been false and not 
ascertaining that the borrowers had applied for credit on three previous occasions and been 
refused.263  The conduct demonstrated the “structural creation of risk and [the] heightening of 
that risk”,264 though “much of the heightened risk in this case arose from the lender’s 
                                                 
249 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 164 [191]. 
250 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 170 [222] - [224]. Even if the 
suboriginator had been regarded as an agent for the originator, that agency would not have extended to the 
separate investment agreement: at 177 [262]- [263]. 
251 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [54] - 55]. The broker, through its 
director, was also found to have misrepresented to the borrowers that they would be eligible for finance and that 
they would receive it, which was misleading and deceptive: at 166 [204]- [205]. 
252 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [59], [63]. 
253 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 139 [57], 164 [194]. 
254 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 164 [194]. 
255 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 139  [58]. 
256 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 139 [54] - [57], 145 [87] - [88], 164 
[195]. The officer gave the borrowers no time to read the documents before signing, telling them the documents 
contained nothing they should worry about.  
257 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 164 [194] - [196]. 
258 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [7], 185 [307]. 
259 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [231] 
260 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 160 [176]. 
261 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at  [16]. 
262 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 186 [310]. 
263 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 187 [317]. 
264 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 186 [315]. 
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implementation of its lending scheme rather than from structurally created risk….”265 But 
carelessness, the creation of structural risk and the heightening of the risk by a “lo doc” 
lending scheme did not amount to unconscionable conduct within the ASIC Act.266   
The conduct of the lender and originator was not unconscionable, as it did not attract 
significant moral censure.267   It was significant that few of indicia of unconscionable conduct 
were met. 268 So the borrowers’ claim of unconscionable conduct by the lender, either directly 
or though the originator, failed.269 
 
In Burniston, the trial judge regarded the originator’s knowledge in relation to the borrowers 
as “materially different” from that of Tonto HL in the Streetwise litigation.270 In Burniston, 
the originator did not know that the borrowers were obtaining their loan from the lender with 
the intention of investing the proceeds of sale (received prior to the lender’s loan) from their 
previous property with the broker. The originator had been told they were going to use the 
loan money to buy an investment property.271 In contrast, Tonto HL knew that Streetwise 
Loans was closely associated with another company, Streetwise Property, and that the loan 
money was to be used for an investment with Streetwise Property.272 
 
 
 
 
Finally, there were the cases where there was just no unconscionable conduct, essentially 
because the lender and its agents did not really do anything wrong: 
 
 
 Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736 273  
Mrs Watson had been in default under a previous loan taken for the purpose of enabling her 
daughter and the daughter’s husband to purchase a pizza shop274 and sought to refinance. A 
finance broker obtained first mortgage finance for her for most of the amount she needed but 
more was required and so the broker arranged a further loan of $50,000 from Mr Fitzgerald, 
secured by a second mortgage over her home. The private lender here had no personal contact 
with Mrs Watson, but acted through his solicitor. When she defaulted, the first mortgagee 
enforced its security, paying the surplus to Mr Fitzgerald.275  
 
The borrower was not in a position of special disadvantage as against the lender.276 
Mrs Watson understood a loan and a mortgage and the consequences of default.277 The loan 
was of a relatively small amount.  At her solicitor’s office, Mrs Watson signed a declaration 
that she had received independent advice and that she could repay the loan without 
substantial hardship. Her solicitor obtained a certificate from an accountant that she had the 
                                                 
265 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 186 [316]; emphasis in original. 
266 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 187 [322]. 
267 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 188 [324]-  [325]. 
268 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 188 [326]. 
269 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 188 [327]. 
270 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 160 [177]. 
271 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 160 [177]. 
272 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 160 [177]. 
273 This loan was also held not to be unjust under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).  
274 Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736 at [4]. 
275 Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736 at [23], [56] 
276 Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736 at[36] 
277 Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736 at [14], [22]. 
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ability to service the debt. 278  The lender relied on the accountant’s certificate and on the 
signed loan ability repayment declaration279 and made no inquiries of the borrower or her 
finance broker, so did not know that the borrower received her income from Centrelink 
payments.280  
 
 Newton v Equititrust Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1075  
A borrower claimed that the lender had engaged in unconscionable conduct when it lent her 
sums of approximately $4 and $2 million and took mortgages over her property. She had 
sought the loans to refinance loans from Westpac, to obtain approval for a proposed tourist 
resort on land she had inherited, and then to carry out the development.281 The court held 
there was no arguable case of unconscionability.282    
 
The borrower was not under special disadvantage283 and was not led into a transaction in 
which she had no real interest; on the contrary, she had entered significant financial 
obligations with Westpac, to actively pursue a substantial development of the property.284 
The loan monies had been made available for her benefit.285  Where the purpose of a loan is 
property development, and the borrower could capitalise interest during the short term of the 
loan,286 capacity to make periodic payments did not arise,287 so it did not matter that the 
borrower had no income and had not filed recent tax returns.288  
 
 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41  
A wife gave a guarantee and mortgage over her home to secure repayment of a debt of a 
company, Darkem Pty Ltd, of which she and her husband were equal shareholders and 
directors. The company sought a loan of $180,000 to commence and conduct a business of 
rice farming and ostrich breeding.  
 
Mrs Crowe understood the risks associated with the transaction and that she could lose the 
property if there was default in repayment; she understood the purport and effect of the 
transaction which had been explained to her by her former and present solicitors289 so she 
was not in position of special disadvantage as against the bank 290 and did not need 
independent financial advice. 
 
                                                 
278 Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736 at [18]. 
279 Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736 at [27] 
280 Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736 at [6] 
281 Newton v Equititrust Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1075 at [26], [31]. 
282 Newton v Equititrust Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1075 at [97]. The context was Ms Newton’s application under the 
Contracts Review legislation for relief from a contract consisting of a settlement of the mortgagee’s claim for 
possession of the land. A basis for this claim was her lack of knowledge that she may have had a defence based 
on a claim that the loan contracts and mortgages were unconscionable. She established a basis for a finding that 
the settlement agreement was “unjust” [75] but to decide whether to grant relief, the court had to determine 
whether she had an arguable claim of unconscionability. Having concluded she did not, the court would not set 
aside the settlement contract.  
283 Newton v Equititrust Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1075 at [99]. 
284 Newton v Equititrust Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1075 at [100], [105] 
285 Newton v Equititrust Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1075 at [107] 
286 The loans were for periods of 12 and 9 months. 
287 Newton v Equititrust Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1075 at [106] 
288 Newton v Equititrust Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1075 at [38] 
289 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41 at [12], [13] [31] [36] 
290 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41 at [72] 
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The lender assessed the serviceability of the loan adequately and had no reason to know the 
intended means of repayment would fail.  Although the borrowers’ accountant had submitted 
an estimate of business cash flow for the first three years, the bank obtained a report from its 
valuer which recommended lending a reduced amount of $143,000, and excluding the more 
risky part of the venture. The valuer’s revised cash flow was discussed with the borrowers; 291 
then recast to take account of additional information, after which it showed a first year deficit 
similar to that produced by the borrowers’ accountant.  
 
The Court of Appeal found that what may have been improvident about the transaction as 
initially proposed, was rendered provident when the ostrich breeding venture was deleted. 292 
The final decision of the two bank officers responsible for approving the facility was that the 
debtor company would generate enough income to service and reduce the debt within the 
term of the five year rice farm leases. That opinion was genuinely held by those officers, and 
was formed reasonably. 293 That the debtor’s business failed did not show it was doomed to 
fail from the outset. So the court was not prepared to find that bank officers knew or ought to 
have known that it was likely the debtor would be unable to service the loan. 294 
 
Independent financial advice would have made no difference, as the trial judge found that the  
borrower would have proceeded with the loan irrespective of what she was told by 
professional advisers.295  She was not a 3rd party guarantor but a director and equal 
shareholder, so she in substance obtained the benefit of the transaction and was a real 
borrower.296   
 
Key factors identified in the cases  
 
Special Disadvantage 
 
Where the borrowers succeeded, two were not under any personal disadvantage in the sense 
of suffering from any linguistic, educational or intellectual disability.297  In the other two 
cases, although the borrowers did suffer from a constitutional disadvantage, that could not be 
taken into account due to the lender’s lack of awareness of it, having had no contact with the 
borrower. 298  
 
In three cases, the courts took the approach that the circumstances of the transaction - a large 
borrowing secured over a borrower’s family home and only asset, where the borrower lacked 
                                                 
291 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41 at [29, [30] 
292 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41 at [66] 
293 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41 at [47]; although one other officer had considered the loan 
was not viable. 
294 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41 at [65] 
295 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41 at [71] 
296 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41 at [73] 
 
297 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [192]; Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at 
[107].   
298  In Teachers Health v Wynne the wife was in a vulnerable emotional state due to marital difficulties 
which made her unable to judge for herself the providence of the transaction (BC 9603022 at 23, 24, 27); in 
Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20,841 the wife lacked education, had limited ability with 
English and suffered from difficult domestic circumstances but these could not be taken into account, as they 
were not known to the lender: [53], [56]. 
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the ability to repay the loan - placed the borrower in a situational disadvantage299 within the 
doctrine of Amadio. The circumstances both produced the disadvantage and were such that 
the lender ought to have been aware of it, or that only someone who could not judge for 
herself that the transaction was improvident, would enter it. Mr Schmidt succeeded under the 
ASIC Act, which did not require a special disadvantage.300 
 
Reliance on the loan application form 
From an application form, the lender gains knowledge about the borrower’s income, 
employment, current assets and liabilities, about the purpose of the loan, and how the 
borrower expects to repay it. Where the circumstances of the loan place the borrower at a 
special disadvantage and there is no contact, the lender learns of those circumstances only 
through the loan application.  
 
In the successful cases, the loan application documents revealed that the borrower lacked 
capacity to repay the loan: they showed the borrower had no income 301 or failed to show any 
income for the borrower 302 or showed such discrepancies about the borrower’s income that 
the lender should have doubted the information.303  The approach was that lending in these 
circumstances indicated reliance on security only and indifference to the borrower’s ability to 
repay, knowing that default would cost the borrower their only asset. This amounted to 
unconscionable conduct, coming from the circumstances in which the transaction was entered 
and from the nature of the transaction.  
 
False information in the loan application  
In two of the successful cases, loans were approved on the basis of false information being 
written into the loan application: Elkofairi and Schmidt, but the borrowers were able to 
succeed, because they had not been involved in this. Mrs Elkofairi’s signature on the loan 
application was forged.304 In Schmidt, the judge pointed out that the lender had not suggested 
that Mr Schmidt had been a party to the false description of his employment and income.305 
The Court of Appeal regarded as significant that Mr Schmidt was not knowingly responsible 
for the inclusion of the false information in the documents.306 
 
But borrowers did not succeed where they lied307 or where their son and his accountant 
lied.308 
 
Lending guidelines  
                                                 
299 Teachers Health v Wynne BC 9603022 at 27; Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20,841 at 
[56]; Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [108], [109].   
300 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [190] - [196] 
301 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [92], [96] 
302 Teachers Health v Wynne (unreported NSWCA, 1996, BC 9603022) at 7, 8, 14; Elkofairi v Permanent 
Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20,841 at [19]. 
303 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [209], [212] 
304 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [17]. 
305 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [209]; see also [77]. The judge accepted Mr 
Schmidt had not read the documents: [90]. The judge regarded Mr Schmidt as “an unsophisticated and naïve 
man who had little financial nous…(who) was putty in the hands of (the fraudster): at [211]. 
306 Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt (2013) 300 ALR 770 at [14], [45]. 
307 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55; [2008] NSWCA 343 at [40], [43], [50] [57], [58];  
Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [45], [48];   Banksia Mtges Ltd v 
Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447 at [30], [49], [51], [92], [106], [140]. 
308 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [624] 
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Whether the lender complied with its lending guidelines was regarded as relevant.  
Lending guidelines are designed to enable a lender to assess and minimise its own risk and 
therefore exist to protect the lender, but following them confers an indirect benefit on 
potential borrowers through risky loans not being made.309  They were also said to be 
relevant, where the lender had no idea of the purpose of the loan, as a failure to observe 
lending guidelines assisted the inference that the lender was lending on the value of the 
security.310  But departures from guidelines are just one factor for evaluation.311  The mere 
fact that guidelines were breached did not necessarily, or even usually, lead to a finding of 
unconscionability. 312  
 
 
Serviceability Assessment  
When considering the lender’s assessment of the loan application, the courts have asked 
whether the lender knew or ought to have known there was a high risk of failure of the 
underlying business or investment and so a high risk of default in repaying the loan.313  
 
It was common for lenders to require a declaration as to the borrowers’ ability to service the 
loan and this  indicated the lender was not indifferent to their capacity to repay.314  Where the 
income disclosed in the loan application, if correct, would have been sufficient to service the 
loan, the courts seemed satisfied with the lenders’ assessment. 315  
 
Benefit of the loan 
The cases have not thoroughly analysed the effect of who obtained the benefit of the loan 
money. In the cases which succeeded, the borrowers received no benefit316 or a relatively 
small benefit.317  But some borrowers who failed also received no benefit from the loan318 or 
only a small benefit.319 The fact that the borrower obtained the benefit of the loan was given 
as a reason why the lending was not unconscionable in one case, 320 although another 
approach was that, if the lender’s conduct was unconscionable, the borrowers would have to 
                                                 
309  In Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Khoshaba [2006] NSWCA 41 Spigelman CJ at [80] – [82], a case not 
involving unconscionability, but cited with approval in Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 
343 at [102]; see also Tonto Home Loans v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [259]. 
310 Of the cases reviewed in this article, only in Elkofairi, was no information about the purpose of the loan 
provided: Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [54].  
311  Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 343 at [117] 
312 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [58], [71]; Tonto Home Loans 
Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [123], [124], [128]; Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) 
(2012) 271 FLR 122 at 186 [310], [316]. 
313 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [99], [123]; Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] 
NSWSC 1447 at [109], [135]-[136];  Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41 at [65]. 
314 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [107]; Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] 
NSWSC 736 at [27] 
315 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [105]; Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker 
[2010] NSWSC 1447 at [79], [83], [105]; Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [625] 
316 Teachers Health v Wynne  (unreported NSWCA, 1996, BC 9603022) at 36; Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 
97 at [99] - [100].  
317 Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20,841 at [99] - [100]; Perpetual Trustees Australia 
Ltd v Schmidt [201] VSC 67 at [233], [236]. 
318 the money went to a fraudster in Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55; [2008] NSWCA 343, 
Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 and Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty 
Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389; and to the borrower’s daughter in Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736. 
319 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 where the loan benefited the borrowers’ children but was a 
refinancing which reduced the borrowers’ liability for interest payments. 
320 Newton v Equititrust Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1075 at [107]. 
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repay the benefit received, as a condition of obtaining relief.321  In a sense, all borrowers 
obtain the benefit of the loan money because even if it goes to another party, the borrower 
must have sought that.  On this approach, where the loan money went would not be a reason 
for distinguishing between cases.  
 
 
Legal advice 
In each case the court considered whether the borrower had received legal advice and its 
adequacy. In only Small v Gray 322 had the lender been entitled to assume the borrower had 
received legal advice.323 There the basic nature of a mortgage and the consequences of 
default had been explained, and the lender received an acknowledgment of legal advice 
signed by the borrower. 324 Despite that, the borrower succeeded because of the lender’s 
knowledge of her lack of ability to repay the loan.  
 
In Teachers Health325, the wife’s signature on the mortgage was witnessed by a solicitor, 
different from the solicitor acting for her husband. 326 The trial judge found that the wife 
understood the nature and effect of the mortgage.327 The wife succeeded because what she 
had needed was advice as to the providence of the transaction and it was not part of a 
solicitor’s function to give financial advice unless retained to do so.328 In Elkofairi, the 
husband and wife signed an “Acknowledgement as to not receiving legal advice.” 329 The 
lender’s knowledge that Mrs Elkofairi had no legal advice was taken into account in 
concluding that the lender had acted unconscionably. Schmidt was another case where the 
borrower sought no advice from a lawyer or financial adviser about the prudence of the 
investments or this loan.330   
 
Accountant’s certificate 
 
The effect of this factor will depend on its terms and reliability. In Small v Gray, the lender 
had an accountant’s certificate to the effect that the mother, as third party mortgagor, 
understood the financial risks associated with the mortgage, and implied, but did not state, 
she had the capacity to repay, which conflicted with her loan application stating she had no 
income.331 That certificate was not sufficient to prevent a conclusion of unconscionability, on 
the basis of the other circumstances.  
 
                                                 
321 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 Edelman J at [397] -[400], [402], [406]; 
see also Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [233] - [236]; on appeal, see Violet Home 
Loans Pty Ltd (CAN 120 045 025) v Schmidt (2013) 300 ALR 770 at [36]. 
322 Small v Gray  [2004] NSWSC 97 
323 Small v Gray  [2004] NSWSC 97 at [107] 
324 Small v Gray  [2004] NSWSC 97 at [107], [31], [32], [107], [110]. 
325 In Teachers’ Health, the lender acted through its solicitors who corresponded with the finance broker and 
solicitors acting for the husband, and the correspondence made it clear that the lender’s solicitors knew the 
husband’s solicitors acted for him only and not for the wife. (BC 9603022 at 26-27)  
326 Teachers Health v Wynne (unreported NSWCA, 1996, BC 9603022 at 12). 
327 Teachers Health v Wynne (unreported NSWCA, 1996, BC 9603022 at 13. 
328 Teachers Health v Wynne (unreported NSWCA, 1996, BC 9603022 at 29.  
329  Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20, 841 at [27]  
330 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [82]  
331 Small v Gray  [2004] NSWSC 97 at [48]-[55], [111]- [112]. 
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But where a borrower’s solicitor obtained an accountant’s certificate of her ability to service 
the debt 332 and the lender relied on the certificate and on her signed declaration of ability to 
repay,333 the lending was not unconscionable in the circumstances of that case.  
 
 
Carelessness by borrowers  
In some cases, borrowers failed to read the loan application and the loan contract before 
signing them334 or failed to take other precautions such as obtaining legal advice 335 and so 
could be regarded as having contributed to their misfortune.  
 
Contributory negligence is not a defence to claims for unconscionable conduct.336  The key 
issue was whether the borrower bore “moral fault” or lacked “good faith.” 337  So where 
borrowers had not intentionally misled anyone or were conscious of the risk of doing so, that 
would not prevent a conclusion of unconscionable conduct where the circumstances 
demonstrated that.338   
 
Conclusion on unconscionable conduct 
 
While there is no general test for determining whether a lender has engaged in 
unconscionable asset lending, some influential factors have been identified. The most 
significant is moral fault. This was indicated if the lender ought to have known there was a 
high risk of default by the borrower, either through lack of income339 or through a high risk of 
failure of the underlying business or investment.340 An aspect of this is misrepresentation of 
the borrower’s financial position in the loan application. So where the lender’s agent, the 
mortgage originator  in Perpetual Trustees v Schmidt, did this, that was attributed to the 
lender, who then had the “high level of moral obloquy” required for unconscionable conduct. 
Conversely, borrowers who did this bore “moral fault” and so did not succeed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
332 Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736 at [18]. 
333 Fitzgerald v Watson [2011] NSWSC 736 at [27] 
334 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 Edelman J at [361]. The borrowers were 
not vulnerable to economic loss which is an important factor in determining whether a duty of care arises 
because they could have protected themselves from the economic loss of $235000 by asking the broker for more 
details about their investment with her or by asking for security for their investment or by obtaining legal 
advice: [343], [348]. In Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 the borrowers were 
“careless in a significant degree”: [215], [219], [223]; this was considered under their claims under the 
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW); Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [75], [90]. 
335 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [185] 
336 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 Edelman J at [189], [354]; Tonto Home 
Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [140].  
337 Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [50]- [52]: no moral fault by Mr Schmidt was 
found: at [51]. 
338 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [219]; this was relevant to the 
borrowers’ claims under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). 
339 Small v Gray [2004] NSWSC 97 at [92], [96]; Teachers Health v Wynne (unreported NSWCA, 1996, BC 
9603022) at 7, 8, 14; Elkofairi v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20,841 at [19]; Perpetual Trustees 
Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [209], [212]. 
340 Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55 at [99], [123]; Banksia Mtges Ltd v Croker [2010] 
NSWSC 1447 at [109], [135]-[136];  Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41 at [65]. 
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Part Two: Lending Through Intermediaries 
 
Business and investment lending of the kind dealt with in this article is commonly done 
through one or more intermediaries; of the thirteen cases reviewed in this article, the lender 
dealt directly with the borrower in only three. 341  In some cases, the lending structure was 
sophisticated, with a number of intermediaries being interposed between the borrower and the 
lender.  
 
Where arrangements were made through intermediaries, if an intermediary engaged in 
unconscionable conduct or gained knowledge of a disadvantage of the borrower, the issue is 
whether the lender could be made responsible for this. The lender would have direct 
liability342  if the conduct or knowledge of the intermediary343 could be attributed to the 
lender.  This requires that the intermediary be at the relevant time an agent of the lender and 
was acting in the course of their authority.344  
 
In the cases reviewed where this was claimed, the intermediaries were mortgage originators 
and finance brokers.  
Structure of lending process 
There could be a wide variety of structures including intermediaries, depending on the 
business model used by the lender.  A typical model followed this structure: 
 The lender was the trustee of an investment fund for institutional investors 345 through 
which loans to borrowers who applied through mortgage originators might be 
made.346 The lender had no contact with borrowers and took no part in the 
procurement or approval of the loan. The lender’s role was limited to entering into the 
loan contract and authorising the release of funds to the borrower.347  
 A lending program manager or trust manager assessed loan applications provided to it 
by originators and made the decision on lending,348 but had no contact with 
                                                 
341 Crowe v Commonwealth Bank [2005] NSWCA 41; Banksia Mortgages v Croker [2010] NSWSC 1447; 
Kowalczuk v Accom Finance Ltd  (2008) 252 ALR 55; [2008] NSWCA 343. 
342 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383  at [214], [215] 
343 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 at [209] 
344 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [638] 
345 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [633]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd 
[2010] NSWSC 1450 at [10]; Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [14]; Tonto Home 
Loans Australia v Tavares: at [91]-[92], [99]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 
at [142]. 
346   Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [10]; Tonto Home Loans 
Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [91]-[92]. 
347 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [604]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd 
[2010] NSWSC 1450 at [10]; Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [3], [15], 
[47]; Tonto Home Loans Australia v Tavares at [92]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 
FLR 122 at [145]- [146]. 
348 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [535] - [537], [612]- [614]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual 
Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [10], [75], [76], [78] where the lending program manager was 
Interstar (later Challenger Management); Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at 
[14], [41], [44]; on appeal Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [22]; in Perpetual Trustee 
Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122, HVB Australia as the trust manager made the lending 
decisions: at [144], [148]; the making of lending decisions was delegated to the mortgage originator in Tonto 
Home Loans v Tavares at [92] 
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borrowers.349  The lenders accepted that the lending program manager was its agent 
due to its making the lending decisions.350  
 Either the lender or the lending program manager appointed under a mortgage 
origination contract one or more intermediaries known as mortgage originators (or 
“originators” ).351  Their function was to introduce borrowers to the lending program 
manager, i.e., to “originate” loans.352   
 Mortgage originators received loan applications from other intermediaries known as 
finance brokers353 (or introducers or sub-originators),354 analysed them, and referred 
satisfactory ones to the lending program manager for approval.355  An originator did 
not necessarily work only for one lending program manager, and might have several 
sources of loans.356   
 Mortgage originators sometimes entered into contracts with finance brokers357 to 
market particular loan products to borrowers; in some cases, the brokers performed 
some of the obligations of the mortgage originator under the mortgage origination 
contract.358   
 Finance brokers received or obtained the loan applications from borrowers,359 or from 
associates of the borrowers who obtained them from the borrowers.360   
A variation to this model was where the lending program manager delegated authority to the 
mortgage originator to assess loan applications and to make the decision about lending up to, 
                                                 
349 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [604]; Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v 
Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [3], [15], [44], [47], [81]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 
FLR 122 at [145]- [146]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [10]. 
350 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [534]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd 
[2010] NSWSC 1450 at [80]; Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [92] - [95], [143], [180]; the exception was 
Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [109] - [115] where an application to 
plead this allegation was raised late and disallowed. 
351   described also as an aggregator in Permanent Mortgages v Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353  
352 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at 631; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd 
[2010] NSWSC 1450 at [10]; Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [50]; 
Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [93]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 
Edelman J at 154 [146] –[148].  
353 An exception was where a mortgage originator also carried on the business of a finance broker and was held 
to have received the borrowers’ loan application from another finance broker, in that capacity: Micarone v 
Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [532].   
354 these terms can be used interchangeably; “sub-originator” appears to be used in Western Australia.  
355 Micarone a v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 t  [532], [535] Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co 
v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [39], [41], [129]; Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [1], 
[16]- [17], [18]-[22]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No2 ) (2012) 271 FLR 122 Edelman J at  [155] - 
[158]. 
356 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [631]; Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v 
Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [147]. 
357 Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [36]; Tonto Home Loans Australia 
Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [97], [130] - [132]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No2 ) 
(2012) 271 FLR 122 Edelman J at  [167]. 
358 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [191]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v 
Burniston (No2 ) (2012) 271 FLR 122 Edelman J at [164] - [167] 
359 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [527], [532]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees 
Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 evidence about how the loan application came to be referred to the Mortgage 
Group was “inconsistent”: at [36]. 
360 Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [81], [83]; on appeal Violet Home 
Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [15]. 
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for example, $500,000.361 Another was where the mortgage originator also carried on 
business as a finance broker.362 Another was where the mortgage originator received loan 
application from parties other than finance brokers.363   
Ultimately, whether a particular intermediary can be characterised as the agent of the lender 
depends on the application of ordinary principles of agency law. 
Agency at common law 
Principles 
Agency arises where one party agrees that another will act on behalf of, in the interests of and 
under the control of, the first party364 and the other agrees to so act.365 There must be a 
requirement not to act otherwise than in the interests of the first party.366   
Control is commonly regarded as a characteristic of agency and can be a decisive indicator 
where an agreement stated that one party was in the relationship of independent contractor to 
another.367  
The agency relationship is fiduciary with the fiduciary duties originating from equity, 
although they may be modified by contract.368 The fiduciary duties lead to another feature of 
agency - the relationship is commercially related rather than commercially adverse, so 
remuneration of the agent is by commission for the services the agent provides rather than the 
agent’s taking an undisclosed profit as an independent intermediary. 369 According to 
Bowstead, another typical feature is that the agent owes to the principal only a duty to use due 
diligence or the agent’s “best endeavours” to achieve the result desired, rather than a promise 
to achieve that result370 but an obligation to use “best endeavours” to introduce loans has 
been treated as an indication against agency.371   
 
                                                 
361 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [92], [93] the mortgage originator was Tonto HL which 
should not be confused with the lender Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd.  The lender accepted that because 
the originator made the lending decisions, the originator was its agent [95]  
362 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees at [533] 
363 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 the application was referred by a 
Jeremy Allan who claimed to be an introducer but was not an “accredited introducer : at [36]- [37], but the judge 
also wrote that the borrowers had submitted it through their agents their son and the fraudster: at [77]. 
364 South Sydney District Rugby Football Club v News Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 611 in Perpetual Trustees Australia 
Pty Ltd v Co v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [125] - [126]; Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [191] 
365 Tonto Home Loans v Tavares [175]- [177]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 
122 at 167 [210]; see also Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Watts and Reynolds Nineteenth Edition 2010 Sweet 
& Maxwell Thomson Reuters para [1-001] 
366 Tonto Home Loans v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at  [175], [177]. 
367 South Sydney District Rugby Football Club v News Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 611 at [132] - [137]; this was the 
case in Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [125]- [126], [146], [153]. 
368 see Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Watts and Reynolds Nineteenth Edition 2010 Sweet & Maxwell 
Thomson Reuters para [1-004]  
369 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Watts and Reynolds Nineteenth Edition 2010 Sweet & Maxwell Thomson 
Reuters para [1-015]; see also para [1-023] 
370 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Watts and Reynolds Nineteenth Edition 2010 Sweet & Maxwell Thomson 
Reuters para [1-016]; see also para [1-020]  
371 Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [2011] NSWCA 389 at [186] 
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It is not essential for agency that the purported agent be able to bind a lender to a loan.372 
Some intermediaries do not make contracts for their principal, but are hired to introduce 
parties who wish to contract and leave them to contract between themselves.373 Remuneration 
is by commission and may come from both parties. Such persons are sometimes referred to as 
brokers. 374 These often have authority to receive and communicate information on their 
principals’ behalf and in doing so, have the capacity to alter their principals’ position. 375 
Establishing agency 
Agency is determined by analysis of the consensual legal relations between the parties, 
including in particular, their contract376 construed in its commercial context.377 So when 
construing an agreement, the use of “the language of agency”378 ie an “appointment” of an 
intermediary to act “on behalf of” the principal,379 is a crucial indicator. Agency could not be 
determined by focusing on the performance by a party of a function important, even 
necessary, to the operation of the business enterprise of the principal in question.380 
Requirements for attribution of conduct or knowledge 
If an agency relationship can be established, and if the misconduct of the agent was within 
the scope of the agent’s express or apparent authority,381 then that misconduct can be 
attributed to the principal, so as to make the principal directly liable for the principal’s own 
(attributed) acts. 382 Similarly knowledge relating to the subject matter of the agency which 
the agent acquires while acting within the scope of the agent’s authority may be imputed to 
the principal.383 
 
Acts amounting to unconscionable conduct can be within an agent’s authority if the agent 
was put in a position to do the class of act complained of, even if the principal directed the 
agent not to do the particular wrongful act.384 Where the contract between the principal and 
agent includes a promise by the agent to act in a lawful manner, that does not limit the 
authority of the agent, but gives the principal a remedy against the agent for breach.385   
Agency under the ASIC Act 
The ASIC Act deals with attribution to a principal of the knowledge or conduct of others.  
                                                 
372 Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [174], [176]. 
373 Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [178];  Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Watts and Reynolds Nineteenth 
Edition 2010 Sweet & Maxwell Thomson Reuters para [1-019] 
374 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Watts and Reynolds Nineteenth Edition 2010 Sweet & Maxwell Thomson 
Reuters para [1-019]. 
375 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Watts and Reynolds Nineteenth Edition 2010 Sweet & Maxwell Thomson 
Reuters para [1-019] 
376 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [192], [194] 
377 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [184], [185], [193] 
378 Permanent Mortgages v Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353 at [289] 
379 Permanent Mortgages v Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353 at [289]. 
380 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [194] 
381 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 175 [254]. 
382 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 167 [209] - [210], [213], [215]. 
383 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Watts and Reynolds Nineteenth Edition 2010 Sweet & Maxwell Thomson 
Reuters para [8-207. 
384 Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [165] 
385 Perpetual Trustees Australia Pty Ltd v Co v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [165] - [166] 
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To show the knowledge or other state of mind386 of a body corporate, it is sufficient to show 
that the agent, who did the relevant act within the scope of the their actual or apparent 
authority, had that state of mind: s 12 GH (1).  
Conduct is deemed to have been engaged in by a principal, if the conduct was engaged in “on 
behalf of” the principal: 
- by an agent “within the scope of their actual or apparent authority”; or  
- by any other person “at the direction or with the consent of” an agent of the principal, 
if the direction or consent was given within the scope of their “actual or apparent 
authority”:  s 12 GH (2), (4).387   
This provision is concerned with the attribution of acts388 and operates to make the principal 
directly liable.389 
Showing the conduct was engaged in “on behalf of” a lender, conveys that something was 
done “for” the lender.390 The concept of agent here is the same as the general law391 but 
acting by the “direction, consent or agreement” of an agent, is a departure from the common 
law position. The subsection specifically contemplates attribution of the conduct of a person 
(who need not be a subagent) who acts at the direction or with the consent, whether express 
or implied, of an agent of the corporation.392    
Intermediaries 
Finance brokers 
The finance broker holds itself out to the world in general as being able to arrange loans.  It is 
approached by a potential borrower, 393 and assists the client to obtain a loan, by formulating 
a suitable application, and knowing to whom to submit it. 394  It usually has no part in the 
decision whether to approve the loan.  Accordingly, finance brokers are generally, but subject 
to the terms of the relevant contract, characterised as the agent of the borrower. 395  
Mortgage originators  
Mortgage origination has been described as the business of finding suitable borrowers for a 
particular lender.396 In the cases considered, mortgagee originators also carried on the 
                                                 
386 ASIC Act s 12 GH (5). 
387 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston  (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 Edelman J at [277].  
388 not liability; its counterpart was Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 84(2) which has now been replaced by 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)  s 139B. 
389 Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [287] - [288]. 
390 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 180 [282]. 
391 Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [287]. 
392 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 182 [289]. 
393 Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [103] 
394 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [131] 
395 Barker v GE Mortgage Solutions Ltd [2013] QCA 137 at [45].  
396 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265  [533]. 
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business of mortgage management, which involved managing a loan for a lender after the 
loan had been made.397  
In these cases, the role of the mortgage originator was defined by an agreement made with 
the lender or lending program manager.398 The duties were to receive loan applications from 
finance brokers, analyse them, interview borrowers,399 conduct some checks of identity, 
credit history and financial position, described as “limited inquiries”, 400 in accordance with 
the guidelines of the lending program manager.401  Verification of borrowers’ claims about 
their financial circumstances was not required;402 in particular, originators were not required 
to check that the information in the loan application was true.403  Despite this, the agreement 
could require the originator to give a warranty to the lending program manager and the lender 
that the originator was satisfied that all statements and information in the loan application and 
documents provided were correct.404   
 
If the originator considered the loan application was satisfactory, the originator could refer 
the application to a lending program manager (or lender) to consider and determine whether 
the loan would be made.405   
 
Once a loan was approved, the originator received commission from the lender. 406 After that, 
the originator performed a management role in relation to the loan, receiving a trailing 
commission from the lender as long as the loan was not in arrears.407  
Finance broker or mortgage originator 
In Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 408 the court had to determine whether a 
particular intermediary should be characterised as acting as a finance broker or mortgage 
                                                 
397 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265  [533]; Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] 
VSC 67  at [152], [155]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [75]. 
398 In Schmidt, the Mortgage Origination Agreement was made between Perpetual, VHLA the mortgage 
originator and MSL, the lending program manager: at [50]. In Michalopoulos, a Loan Origination and 
Management Agreement was made between The Mortgage Group (the mortgage originator) and Interstar (the 
lending program manager) at [10], [76]. In Micarone, the lender’s agent Puma Management Ltd and IF&I as 
mortgage originator entered into a mortgage origination deed and a document called “Puma Parameters” at 
[631]. In Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 there was a “Sale, Origination and 
Servicing Agreement” between the lender, the originator and the trust manager: at [154]. 
399 although in Schmidt the lending program manager condoned the originator’s practice of not interviewing 
borrowers at [55]-[66];  Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [58] 
400 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [70] 
401 Schmidt at [55]. A mortgage originator who failed to interview an applicant for a loan and failed to take 
reasonable care to identify the applicant was held liable to the lender for its breach of the obligations imposed by 
the mortgage origination deed: Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v CTC Group Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 252. 
402 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 [54], [55], [64] – [66]; Michalopoulos v 
Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at at [55], [58], [60], [70], [71]. 
403 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [70] - [71]; Micarone v Perpetual 
Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at  [535] 
404 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [55] - [56] 
405 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [39], [41]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees 
Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [75] -[76]. 
406 Schmidt [50]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [76]. 
407 Schmidt [43], [50] Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [75]; Micarone 
at [632], [635] 
408 Full Court of South Australia Debelle and Wicks JJ majority; Olssen J dissenting. The High Court refused 
special leave to appeal 12 May 2000 [2000] HCA Trans 225.  
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originator. In IF& I carried on the business of finance broker, but was also a mortgage 
originator and manager. IF&I received the borrowers’ loan application from another finance 
broker409 and submitted the loan application to two lenders who refused to lend.410  It then re-
drafted the loan application,411 and submitted it to Perpetual’s lending program manager who 
assessed it and made the decision to lend.412  
 
The court held that when IF&I acquired the knowledge of refusals, it was acting as a finance 
broker,413 so was not the agent of Perpetual. Forwarding loan applications to potential 
lenders, and redrafting the application, were seen as acts done in the interests of borrowers.414 
 
 
Making the lender responsible for misconduct of an intermediary, whether a finance 
broker or mortgage originator, involves several elements:  
 
(1) the conduct of the intermediary must be able to be classified as unconscionable or 
their knowledge must be relevant to whether the borrower was under a special 
disability; and  
(2) the intermediary must be the agent of the party with whom they made a contract, so a  
finance broker must be the agent of the originator and an originator must be the agent 
of the lending program manager or the lender; and  
(3) the intermediary’s misconduct had to be committed or knowledge acquired while 
acting within the scope of the agent’s authority; 
(4) the finance broker’s conduct or knowledge must also be able to be attributed to the 
lender (double attribution) or where the originator was the agent of the lending 
program manager, their conduct or knowledge must also be able to be attributed to the 
lender (double attribution). 
 
In one case, a preliminary issue was whether the particular officer of the finance broker, who 
engaged in unconscionable conduct, did that on behalf of the finance broker or on her own 
behalf. This arose in Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 where a 
director of a finance broking company415 persuaded the borrowers to invest $235,000 with 
her.416 This was part of a course of conduct engaged in by the director towards the borrowers 
from several years before,417 their investment agreement was with her personally, rather than 
with the finance broking company,418 and they did not appoint the company as their finance 
                                                 
409 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [532] 
410 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [533] 
411 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [534], [607] 
412 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265535] - [537], [612] - [614] 
413 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at  [638] 
414 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at  [632]  
 
415 Described in the judgment as “the broker” 
416 This was discussed in Part One.  
417 The director had persuaded them to invest $50,000 with her from 2005 - Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v 
Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [4],[18], [20] - and had made misrepresentations about the $235,000 
investment from 2006 [24] - [28]; [223]. 
418 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 134 [22], 143 [80]; 166 [205]. 
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broker until a later time.419  So this unconscionable conduct420 could not be attributed even to 
the finance broking company.421  
 
1. The intermediary engaged in unconscionable conduct or had knowledge of circumstances 
relevant to unconscionability 
 
Finance brokers 
As discussed in Part One, in several cases, the finance broker made false representations in 
the loan application and possessed knowledge relevant to whether the loan was 
unconscionable:  
 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt:  the finance broker altered the figures in 
the loan application documents for the borrower’s income to fit the lender’s 
criteria;422   
 Tonto Home Loans: the finance broker inserted false information about the 
borrowers’ financial position in their loan applications, and knew they could not 
afford to repay the loans 423  
 Burniston the finance broking company made false representations in the loan 
application about the purpose of the loan424 and the borrowers’ financial position, 425 
and obtained the borrowers’ execution of the loan documents in a procedurally unfair 
manner.426  
Mortgage originators 
The mortgage originators in Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 
389 and Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) 427 were held not to have engaged in 
unconscionable conduct, as discussed in Part One. In both cases borrowers were defrauded of 
substantial sums by the finance broker (Tonto) or a director of the finance broker (Burniston). 
In both cases, the originators had created a structural risk of fraud, 428 and heightened that risk 
by breaches of their lending guidelines.  429 Also in Tonto, the originator demonstrated lack of 
regard for the borrowers’ capacity to repay, other than through the sale of their homes.430 But 
without knowledge that information in the loan application was false, unconscionable 
conduct could not be found. 431 
 
                                                 
419 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 136 [32]. 
420 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 164 [191]. 
421 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 170 [222], [224]. Even if the 
suboriginator had been regarded as an agent for the originator, that agency would not have extended to the 
separate investment agreement: at 177 [262]-[263]. 
422 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [88] - [94], [127], [214] 
423 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [148]. 
424 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 139 at [57], [59], [63] 
425 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 139 [57]. 
426 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 139 [54]-[57], 145 [87]-[88], 164 [195].   
427 In Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 the originator was held to be in the equivalent 
position to Tonto Home Loans in the Streetwise litigation: at 160 [176]. 
428 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [230], [234]. 
429 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [123], [124]; Perpetual Trustee v 
Burniston (No 2)  (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 186 [316], [128]. 
430 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [123] - [124], [259], [291] – [292].   
431 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [264], [288], [292] - [294]  ; Perpetual Trustee v Burniston 
(No 2) at [16],188 [324] - [325]. 
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In Schmidt, the originator’s conduct was more culpable432 in that the originator knowingly 
participated in the finance broker’s making false statements about the borrower’s income in 
the loan application, when it was aware of the borrower’s circumstances which indicated the 
borrower would be unable to repay the loan, secured over his only asset.433 The originator’s 
conduct was held to be morally repugnant asset lending, and unconscionable conduct 
contrary to the ASIC Act. 434  
 
The cases demonstrate that unless the mortgage originator knew of, or was recklessly 
indifferent or wilfully blind to, false statements of the borrowers’ financial position or the 
purpose of the loan in the loan application, unconscionable conduct was not established 
against them. This was shown only in Schmidt; failing to comply with their contractual 
obligations or lending guidelines, creating and heightening the risk of fraud, and failing to 
properly assess the ability to repay were not enough.  
 
2. Was the relationship between finance broker and mortgage originator or between the 
originator and lending program manager one of agency? 
 
Finance broker and mortgage originator   
A relationship between a finance broker and mortgage originator would usually commence 
with the originator targeting the particular broker for recruitment as a source of finance 
applications from potential borrowers435 The accreditation process involved the broker 
completing an application form, being interviewed and obtaining professional indemnity 
insurance;436 the originator also conducted ASIC or licence searches.  437  
 
The ordinary rule is that where a broker facilitates the provision of a loan through a financer, 
the broker is not regarded as the agent of the financier.438  These cases followed that rule. 439  
 
A contract between the originator and the finance broker regulated their relationship.440  
                                                 
432 and to have been  more culpable than that of the originator in Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares 
[2011] NSWCA 389 due to its knowledge of false information in the loan application which Tonto did not have: 
Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt [2013] VSCA 56 at [59].   
433 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [23], [33], [86], [198], [209]. 
434 The trial judge found unconscionable conduct under s 12CB ASIC Act (as at 2009) [213]; this was upheld on 
appeal: Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Schmidt (2013) 300 ALR 770 [53]- [76].  The trial judge also found 
unconscionable conduct under the general law and under s 51AC Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth): [213].  On 
appeal, the Court did not need to decide whether that was correct, as the equitable concept of unconscionability 
was narrower than statutory unconscionability: [80].  It was also unnecessary to decide whether Mr Schmidt 
acquired the financial services for the purposes of trade or commerce [76] -[77]. 
435 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [37]; Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v 
Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at 131], [185] although the approach came from the broker in Perpetual Trustee v 
Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [48]. 
436 Perpetual Trustee v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [50]; Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v 
Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [37] 
437 Schmidt at Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [37]; Perpetual Trustee v Burniston 
(No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [49] 
438 Morlend Finance Corporation (Vic) Pty Ltd v Westendorp [1993] 2 VR 284; Con-Stan Industries of 
Australia Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterrhur Insurance Australia Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 226 at 234; the same 
approach was taken to finance brokers in Esanda Finance Corporation v Spence Financial Group [2006] 
WASC 177 at [54] - [65]. 
439 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt at [131]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) at [244] -
[247] and Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [632]. 
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Contractual provisions confirmed the absence of any agency relationship:   
(1) The commercial context was that the finance broker had an existing independent 
business acting for its own clients in arranging mortgage loans with lenders and sought or 
was sought, to market the originator’s loan products. 441   
(2) The finance broker had fiduciary duties to act in good faith and in the interests of 
its own  customers.442 These were not consistent with being the agent of, and owing fiduciary 
duties to, the originator. 443  
(3) The contracts did not oblige the finance broker to refer any particular application 
to the originator; 444 the obligation instead was to “endeavour” to introduce loans.445   
 
(4) Provisions to the effect that the finance broker was not to disclose to borrowers the 
existence of an agreement with the originator 446 or stating that the finance broker was an 
independent contractor447 indicated the finance broker was not representing the originator. 
 
(5) The agreement did not purport to regulate how the finance broker conducted its 
business prior to the point of introduction of loans, apart from imposing an obligation to 
maintain sound business practices;448 although there were specific obligations attached to the 
submission of loan applications.449    
(6) The originator agreed to pay the finance broker commission on each approved 
loan450 and the finance broker’s earning fees this way was seen as part of its own profit 
making enterprise. 451 
Therefore the finance broker was not held to be the agent of the originator in any case.452 This 
was not altered by the finance broker having agreed to carry out organisational tasks such as 
                                                                                                                                                        
440 A “referral agreement” between the originator, VHLA. and the finance broker, Medallion Finance Concepts 
Pty Ltd, in Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt 2010] VSC 67 at [36]; an “Introduction Deed” between 
the originator, Tonto HL, and the broker Streetwise Loans, in Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares 
[2011] NSWCA 389 [130], [132]; and a “Sub-Originator Agreement” between the originator and the finance 
broker in Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 157 [167]- [170]. 
441 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [185]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 
271 FLR 122 at 157 [167]. 
442 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [185]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 
271 FLR 122 at 175 [251]. 
443 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 174 [251]. 
444 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 158 [169]; Tonto Home Loans Australia 
Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [187]. 
445 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [2011] NSWCA 389 [132], [186] -[187]. This was 
interpreted to impose no obligation at all, but see Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Watts and Reynolds 
Nineteenth Edition 2010 Sweet & Maxwell Thomson Reuters paras [1-016], [1-020].  
 
446 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [189] 
447 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 157-8 [169], 174 [249] Clause 2.2 
Agreement. 
448 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [190]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v 
Burniston (No 2) at 157-8 [169]. 
449 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [188]; Perpetual Trustees Australia 
Ltd v Schmidt at [36], [130]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 157-8 [169]. 
450 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [130], [132] 
451 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 174 [249]; see also [169] - [170]. 
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interviewing prospective borrowers, collecting information and completing loan application 
forms.453 Nor was it altered by a requirement to attend training. 454 
Originator and lending program manager455 
  
In determining whether a mortgage originator was an agent of the lender or lending program 
manager, the cases reveal three different kinds of closeness with the lender: (1) where the 
lending program manager had delegated the lending decisions to the mortgage originator; (2) 
where the usual lending structure was followed with the mortgage originator playing no part 
in the decision to lend; and (3) where the mortgage originator carried on a finance broking 
business as well.  
 Departure from usual lending structure so mortgage originator makes credit decisions 
This was the case in Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389. 
Under both lending programs,456 Tonto HL as mortgage originator was delegated authority to 
make the credit decisions on lending.457 The lenders accepted the mortgage originator was 
their agent. 458 
 The usual lending structure  
In these circumstances, to determine agency, the court construed the agreement made 
between the mortgage originator and the lending program manager, in the surrounding 
circumstances.459  
 
In Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt 460 and Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees 
Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450, 461 provisions in the appointment agreements that 
indicated agency included:  
  
(1) The originator’s dealings with the borrower, prior to signing the loan contract and 
subsequently, were on behalf of the lender, with the consent of the lender and in a 
manner dictated by the lender, showing that the lender controlled the originator’s 
activities.  462   
                                                                                                                                                        
452 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [191], [195], [287]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston 
(No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 175 [252]. 
453 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [109], [133], [191]- [192]; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v 
Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 174 [248]; Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt at [36], [130] . 
454 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt at [36], [37], [131] 
455  A thorough analysis of the application of agency principles to an originator agreement can be found in the 
guarantees case Permanent Mortgages v Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353 at [289] - [320] .. 
456 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [91] 
457 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [93], [95], [99], [174], [175]. 
458 Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 at [95], [143], [180]. 
459 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt  [2010] VSC 67 at [119], [145], [150] – [151]. 
460 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [150], [213]; this finding was not challenged 
on appeal, see Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd (CAN 120 045 025) v Schmidt (2013) 300 ALR 770 at [31] 
461 The borrowers claimed the mortgage originator here ought to have had knowledge of their special 
disadvantage, but this special disadvantage was held to be in relation to their investment with the fraudster, not 
in relation to the loan:  [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [92] - [93]. 
462 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [153]. 
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(2) When the originator secured the loan application, ensured that the documents were in 
order and complied with the lending parameters, that was for the benefit of the 
lender;463 
(3) The originator was required to comply with the directions given by the lender or 
lending program manager;464  
(4) The originator had an obligation to provide to the lending program manager 
information adverse to the interests of a borrower, if that could be relevant to deciding 
whether to lend or not. 465 
 
Additional factors were that the borrowers had not engaged the originator to act on their 
behalf 466 and the lender, not the borrower, paid commission to the originator when a loan 
contract was made. 467   
 
The conclusion of agency was not prevented by the parties’ agreement that the originator was 
an independent contractor468 because the characteristic of control or direction by the principal 
was a decisive indicator of agency where such a provision was included. 469  That the 
originator had other sources from which it could obtain loans for potential borrowers and was 
under no duty to offer potential borrowers first to the lender also made no difference470  
 
Thus in both cases the originator was held to be acting as the lender’s agent. In this way,  the 
unconscionable conduct of the originator in Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt could 
be attributed to the lender.471 
 
 Where the mortgage originator also carried on a finance broking business.  
 
In Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265, 472 IF& I carried on the business of a 
finance broker, mortgage originator and manager, and was held to have been acting as a 
finance broker at the relevant time,473 as has been explained.  
 
                                                 
463 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [152] 
464 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [154]; see also the guarantees case Permanent 
Mortgages v Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353 at [299]- [301]. 
465 Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [78], [79] 
466 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [155]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees 
Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [77]. 
467 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [50]; Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees 
Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [76] although the court there made clear the fact the Mortgage Group was 
paid by Interstar was not sufficient to make the Mortgage Group Interstar’s agent. 
468 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [146]; that was not stated to be the case in 
Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [77]; see also Permanent Mortgages v 
Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353 at [291], [295]. 
469 South Sydney District Rugby Football Club v News Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 611 at [132] - [137], applied in 
Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [125]- [126], [153] - [154]. 
470 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [144], [147]; this was also the case in 
Permanent Mortgages v Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353 at [294]- [295], [299]. 
471 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [212]-[214]. 
472 Full Court of South Australia Debelle and Wicks JJ majority; Olssen J dissenting. The High Court refused 
special leave to appeal 12 May 2000 [2000] HCA Trans 225.  
473 when it submitted the loan application to other lenders and re-drafted the application before submitting it to 
Perpetual:  Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [533], [534], [607] 
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At this time, I F & I had entered into a mortgage origination agreement with the lending 
program manager.474 The majority judges decided that, under this agreement, IF&I was an 
independent contractor. One reason given was that IF& I could choose, but was not obliged, 
to offer potential borrowers first to the lending program manager.475  This though was also 
the case in Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt.476 Another reason was that IF&I had a 
contractual duty to disclose all information that was relevant to enable the lender to decide 
whether to enter a loan agreement, and was liable in damages for failure to do so.477 This was 
also the case in Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt.478 The third reason was that IF&I 
received no commission from the lender; it received only a procuration fee from the 
borrowers. 479 
 
Once a loan application had been accepted, IF&I was appointed an agent for the limited 
purpose of arranging completion of transaction and to manage the mortgage480 and for this, 
received a management fee from Puma.481 In this respect also, the judges’ approach was 
different from that taken in Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt, where the court took 
into account that the originator played a managerial role on behalf of the lender after the 
funds were released, in deciding that the originator was the lender’s agent for the making of 
the loan and entry into the loan contract, which was the crucial time.482 
 
The key differences appear to be that IF&I was also a broker and the lender did not pay IF&I 
any commission. Nevertheless, these decisions do reflect some difference in approach.  It 
may be significant that in Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt the borrowers 
succeeded, but in Micarone they failed. 
3. Unconscionable conduct committed or knowledge acquired while acting within the scope 
of the agent’s authority.483  
The general rule is that the principal is responsible for all acts of his or her agent committed 
within the scope of that agent’s authority, including acts which are necessary or ordinarily 
incidental to the exercise of express authority.484 So to make the principal liable, even if an 
agency relationship can be established, the agent’s particular actions must also be done within 
their actual or ostensible authority.  
                                                 
474 The Mortgage Origination Deed and The Puma Fund Program Parameters: Micarone v Perpetual Trustees 
[1999] SASC 265 at [631] 
475 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [631] 
476 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [144], [147]; see also Permanent Mortgages v 
Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353 at [294]- [295], [299]. 
477 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [633], [638], [639]. Contrast the approach of Olsson J 
(dissenting) who described IF&I as a finance broker [84] but wrote that even if IF&I obtained the information as 
an independent contractor, because IF&I was to conduct due diligence inquiries for Puma, it was the “agent to 
know” so its knowledge must be imputed to Puma: at [220]. 
478 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [6], [51, [55], [240] - [241]; see also 
Permanent Mortgages v Vandenbergh (2010) 41 WAR 353 at [294]- [295], [299]. 
479 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [632], [639]. 
480 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [635] 
481 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [1999] SASC 265 at [632] 
482 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [150] 
483 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 175 [254] - [255]; Tonto Home Loans 
Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares at [173]; Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Watts and Reynolds Nineteenth Edition 
2010 Sweet & Maxwell Thomson Reuters [8-207] 
484 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [159] 
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Finance brokers 
When a finance broker represented the borrower’s financial position in the loan application 
form and presented loan documents for execution by the borrowers, those actions were not 
regarded as being done on behalf of the originator.485 The broker acted on behalf of the 
borrowers, or on its own behalf, in performing each of these functions as part of its finance 
broking business.486  
Mortgage originators   
 
In Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt, the mortgage originator had been invested 
with authority to process loan applications on behalf of the lender. As explained in Part One, 
in doing so, the mortgage originator breached the lender’s guidelines and engaged in 
unconscionable conduct.  
 
The principal was held liable to the borrower for the way the originator had processed loan 
applications, because the originator had been authorised to process them and the originator’s 
authority was not limited by the lending guidelines.487 This was the case, although the lender 
had not authorised the originator to commit unconscionable conduct or contravene the 
lending guidelines. Instead, the lender had a remedy against the originator for its breach of 
their contract. 488 
 
 
4. Double attribution of conduct or knowledge of the finance broker to the originator and then 
to the lender or of the originator to the lending program manager and then to the lender?  
 
The next element is whether a principal could be made liable for the acts of a sub-agent. In 
this context, the question is whether acts of the finance broker or mortgage originator might 
be attributed not only to the party with whom they contracted, but on to the lender. When 
dealing with the equitable doctrine of unconscionable conduct, the question needs to be 
considered under general principles of agency law; when dealing with unconscionable 
conduct under s 12CB ASIC Act, the application of s 12GH needs to be considered.   
 
The cases dealing with attribution under common law agency principles took different 
approaches.489  The “delegation with authority” approach accepted in Tonto Home Loans 
Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares [2011] NSWCA 389 was that, because Tonto HL as mortgage 
originator was the agent of the lender, and was authorised by the lender to appoint an agent, 
then if Tonto HL had appointed the finance broker Streetwise Loans to be its agent, that 
appointment would have been within the scope of the authority of Tonto HL. Therefore the 
finance broker would also have been the agent of the lender.490 
  
                                                 
485 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [259]. 
486 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [259] (emphasis in original). 
487 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [166]  
 
488 Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt [2010] VSC 67 at [166] - [170] 
489 Another approach was taken in relation to mortgage originators in Michalopoulos v  Perpetual Trustees 
Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [82], [92] - [95]. 
490 The approach of the trial judge in Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v O’Donnell (2009) 15 BPR 28,101 at [362] 
was accepted by the Court of Appeal in Tonto Home Loans v Tavares at [143], [180]; see also [287] - [288].  
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The “more restrictive approach”491 to making a principal liable for the acts of a sub-agent, 
taken in Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2), is that not only must the agent have 
authority from the principal to appoint the sub-agent, but also to create the relationship of 
principal and agent between the principal and sub-agent, and as well the agent and sub-agent 
must also intend to create that direct agency relationship between the principal and the sub-
agent.492 This was because the principled basis of agency as a relationship of manifested 
consent, required that a principal not be bound by a sub-agent’s acts unless the principal, 
agent and sub-agent manifested an intention to that effect.493   
 
That meant that the borrowers needed to prove that both the originator and the finance broker 
intended that the acts of the finance broker would bind the lender.494  There was no evidence 
of this in that case.495   
The requirements for the double attribution of conduct under the ASIC Act are that the 
conduct was engaged in “on behalf of” the principal and then either the actor was an agent 
acting within their authority or the actor acted at the direction or with the consent of an agent 
acting within their authority.496  The cases dealing with attribution under this provision and 
its analogues also took different approaches.  
In Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) the unconscionable conduct of the finance 
broking company (making false representations and procuring the borrowers’ execution of 
the loan documents in a procedurally unfair way) was not done “on behalf of” either the 
originator or the lender. Instead, the acts were done for the benefit of the finance broker and 
as part of the finance broker’s business.497 Then, for the second requirement, the first 
alternative was that the actor be an “agent”. The court held that the finance broker was not a 
sub-agent, but in any event, the concept of a sub-agent fell outside the provision.498  The 
second alternative - acting “at the direction or with the consent of an agent” - was not met 
because the finance broker was prohibited by its contract with the originator (an agent) from 
submitting a loan application it believed contained false information, from contravening the 
Code of Banking Practice and the Trade Practices Act, and from making representations 
about the loan.499 For these reasons, the conduct of the finance broker could not be attributed 
to the lender under s 12 GH.500  
A different approach was evident in Michalopoulos v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd, in the 
context of attributing the knowledge of an officer of the mortgage originator, which was held 
                                                 
491 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at [240] supported by “the overwhelming 
weight of Anglo-Australian authority; in contrast to the US approach which is only that the delegation be 
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499 did not engage in unconscionable conduct nor did they have knowledge relevant to unconscionable conduct. 
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misrepresentations about the borrowers financial circumstances and purpose. 499 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v 
Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 182 [292]. 
500 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Burniston (No 2) (2012) 271 FLR 122 at 182 [293]. 
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to be the agent of the lending program manager, to the lender.501  The court held that the 
deeming effect of the provision had a successive application, so conduct engaged in by the 
officer was deemed to have been engaged in by the mortgage originator, and then was 
deemed to have been engaged in by the lending program manager, and then by the lender.502  
In a similar way, the knowledge of a sub-agent could be attributed to the principal. 503  
 
 
Conclusion on agency 
 
In view of all these difficulties, it is unsurprising that there is no case where the borrowers’ 
claim that the finance broker’s wrongdoing should be attributed to the lender was successful.  
Most mortgage originators were regarded as agents of the lender, with Micarone probably 
being confined to the particular circumstances of an intermediary carrying on both kinds of 
business.  But only one originator was found to have engaged in acts amounting to 
unconscionable conduct, which could be attributed to the lender.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This review of the cases demonstrates that, in general, the equitable doctrine and the statute 
work well to protect borrowers. The exception was where finance brokers misrepresented the 
financial position of borrowers without their knowledge, and then mortgage originators failed 
to comply with lending guidelines by making checks and inquiries, but the lenders, through 
their lack of knowledge of the fraud, were held not to have engaged in unconscionable 
conduct.504 The most troubling case was Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares 
where the loan money went to the associate of the fraudulent finance broker and the lender’s 
agent knew of that association. There the lender was able to shelter behind the finding that 
the fraudulent finance broker was not its agent,505 while the conduct of the mortgage 
originator, who was an agent, was not serious enough to satisfy the statutory test. 
 
Fortunately a remedy was available there under the contracts review legislation of New South 
Wales .506 If similar circumstances arose now, the unjust contracts provisions of the National 
Credit Code would be available if the loan was for residential property investment. But if 
similar facts arose in the context of a loan for a business or investment purpose, the remedies 
for unconscionable conduct would give borrowers no redress. When agency principles were 
applied to the business structure the lenders had put in place, their position was as detached 
                                                 
501  Considered under s 84 (2) of the Trade Practices Act (Cth) 1974, which was in similar terms to s 12 
GH ASIC Act. 
502 Michalopoulos v  Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1450 at [82]. 
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third parties,507 though the system they established and how they let it operate facilitated the 
perpetration of fraud.508  
 
A lender who wishes to establish a lending program based on independent contracts with 
intermediaries,509 particularly when the “important process of information collection” has 
been sub-contracted,510 should bear significant responsibility for the operation of their 
program.511 They should guard against fraud, “an obvious systemic risk”.512  Lenders have 
the opportunity, through their selection and accreditation process513 and through the  
administration and enforcement of proper lending guidelines, to prevent fraud and 
inappropriate lending. 514 
 
The law needs to strike a balance between allowing lenders reasonable flexibility in their 
business model, and preventing them from using their model to insulate themselves from 
fraud and predatory conduct towards borrowers by those whom they chose and should 
regulate.  
 
This article concludes that loans for business or investment made to individuals or small 
business owners should be amenable to re-opening under the unjust contracts provisions of 
the National Credit Code. If this were the case, lenders could be held responsible for the 
wrongdoing of intermediaries in these circumstances. That would give lenders an incentive to 
exercise effective control over intermediaries and to make proper checks and inquiries, and 
would simplify proof in cases where there has been some real wrongdoing. Further, or in the 
alternative, those intermediaries with whom the lender, or the lending manager, has a contract 
should be taken to be the agents of the lender, and their knowledge should be attributed to the 
lender.   
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